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371 
AALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PANEL ON 
BROWN, ANOTHER COUNCIL OF NICAEA? 
Kelly A. MacGrady and John W. Van Doren1 
[The “stupidest housemaid” is speaking and she says, speaking 
about herself] “. . . .It scare the stupidest housemaid, but she can look at 
the Fourteenth Amendment and read Plessy v. Ferguson and think that 
opinion is rightly decided.  It seems correct.  The rationale makes sense.  
Hell, Chief Justice Rehnquist said the same thing when he was a law 
clerk.  But then to the relief of the stupidest housemaid, the Brown v. 
Board of Education opinion makes sense too.  It seems right also.  So 
much for the rule of law.  And that scare her too.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  Summary of Thesis 
1.  The AALS Panel on Brown 
When considering the product of the AALS Constitutional Law 
Panel, entitled “What Brown Should Have Said,” held in January 2000, 
in Washington, D.C., we have experienced considerable disorientation.3 
                                                          
 1. Kelly A. MacGrady served as an Associate Editor on the Florida State University Law 
Review; J.D. Florida State Unversity College of Law, 2002; Smith College, 1997 B.A.  John W. 
VanDoren is a Professor at Florida State University College of Law, and a graduate of Harvard Col-
lege, 1956 A.B., and Yale Law School, 1959.  Both wish to thank Florida State College of Law and 
Dean Don Weidner for research support.  Thanks also to Attorney Sonia Crockett for proof reading 
and emotional support. 
 2. David L. Shapiro, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: A Fiftieth Anniversary Sympo-
sium, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1834, 1922 (1999) (citations omitted). 
 3. See Section on Constitutional Law, What Brown Should Have Said, in A Recommitment 
to Diversity, Annual Meeting, AALS Program Jan. 5-9, 2000 (2000).  The proceedings were pub-
lished in book form in the summer of 2001, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE 
SAID, (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2001).  We are not concerned with any differences there may be between 
the Panelists’ oral opinions at the AALS panel and their written opinions in the book; our concern is 
1
MacGrady and Van Doren: Another Council of Nicaea?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
MACGRADY1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:50 PM 
372 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: 3/4 
We therefore ask the question asked by Lucretia in Machievelli’s play, 
The Mandragola, “Do you mean it or are you laughing at me?”4 
We fear that the Panelists may be laughing at us.5  Because, in 
short, their writings criticize the formalism that they use in the panel 
court opinions.  In this article, we pick four of the Panelists, more or less 
at random, and confront the question of whether their writings before 
and after Brown6 square with their panel Brown opinions. Those four 
are: Professors John Balkin, Catharine MacKinnon, Michael McConnell, 
and John Hart Ely. Details of the claims made in this article are confined 
to these four Panelists.  Strong suspicions, only alluded to in passing 
here, have been raised with respect to the other Panelists.7 
After Part I, Summary of Thesis, this article will proceed by dis-
cussing a parallel between the AALS Constitutional Law Panel and the 
Council of Nicaea in 325 CE that both authorities were dealing with a 
social crisis.  In Part III, we refer to the dissonance of the Panel’s inter-
nal conflicts.  In Part IV, we suggest that four Panelists’ formalist opin-
ions in Brown conflict with the jurisprudence of their previous writings.  
In Part V, we speculate on how it could occur that these distinguished 
Panelists could find themselves in such a contradiction. 
 
 
                                                          
only with their oral opinions. 
 4. In that play, our young protagonist covets a young married woman named Lucretia. She is 
married to an older man who is having difficulty procreating an heir. Our protagonist enlists the 
help of Lucretia’s confessor, Father Timothy, in a complicated Machiavellian plan. The plotters will 
tell her husband that if Lucretia will take the Mandragola potion, and lie with a stranger picked off 
the street, her husband will then be able to produce an heir by her. The confessor sides with the plot-
ters and advises her to go ahead with the plan. Father Timothy states that he has been pouring over 
the books and the authorities, and that “there are numerous considerations on our side both general 
and particular.” Lucretia replies with the above quoted lines: “Do you mean it or are you laughing at 
me?” Nicolo Machiavelli, Mandragola, in Eight Great Comedies 60-90 (Barnet, Berman Burto 
eds.). 
 5. Before going to the AALS Panel on Brown, co-author Van Doren was having second 
thoughts about research.  He was churning out yet another unreconstructed legal realist or even crit-
ical legal studies story line, this time on contracts. (For doubts on research enterprises, see John W. 
Teeter Jr., The Daishonin’s Path: Applying Nichiren’s Buddhist Principles to American Legal Edu-
cation, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 271, 276 (1999) (questioning whether we really should be “grinding 
out yet another article” when we could be, for example, making ourselves more available to stu-
dents?)).  Id.  So in that mood, he was wondering if this was really necessary.  After all, are not we 
“all realists now”?  The panel convinced him that we are not all realists now, so this article was 
written. 
 6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7. There were Derrick Bell, Cass Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, Drew S. Days, III and Frank 
Michaelman. Professor Patricia Williams was scheduled to attend the panel meeting, but did not. 
2
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2.  History of Brown 
But first a bit of legal history. The United States Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Board of Education held that the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment forbade discrimination inherent in separate 
but equal educational facilities for African Americans and white per-
sons.8 This case created a terrific controversy and crisis in U.S. society,9 
which had ramifications in U.S. law and jurisprudence circles. The con-
troversy over Brown fueled the fire of the movement to impeach Earl 
Warren,10 the Chief Justice who was instrumental in bringing forth the 
unanimous decision. Congress, debating whether to divest the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction in cases involving admission to the bar, loyalty se-
curity matters, and other McCarthy era matters got support from South-
ern segregationists who added their voices to that movement.11 And lat-
er, in Little Rock, President Eisenhower used federal troops to 
desegregate the schools there.12 However, Brown, at least today, is ac-
cepted across a wide political spectrum.13 It is accepted as a morally cor-
rect decision, though the legal foundation on which it is based is deemed 
rather shaky.14 
Brown, created in the teeth of precedent, overruled while purporting 
to distinguish a leading precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson,15 and ignored the 
state legislatures, which had decreed and reinforced segregation one way 
or another.  Segregated schools also existed in the District of Columbia, 
where Congress had turned a blind eye to such segregation in schools.  
These popularly elected bodies were complicitous or passively acquies-
cent in segregation.  Now here comes the elite, appointed, and not popu-
                                                          
 8. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 9. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 247-72 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) 
[hereinafter “CIVIL RIGHTS”] (discussing active and violent resistance to Brown). 
 10. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 389-92 (Simon & Schus-
ter 1997) [hereinafter “CHIEF”] (desegregation decision fuels impeachment move). 
 11. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 660 (Alfred A. 
Knopf 1994) [hereinafter “HAND”] (Senate considers eliminating Court’s jurisdiction in bar admis-
sion, loyalty-security, and other matters).  Southern segregationists join in this jurisdiction stripping 
bill.  Id. at 660. 
 12. See CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 258-59 (Eisenhower ordered federal troops to Little 
Rock); CHIEF, supra note 10, at 343 (Eisenhower had waited and evaded crises by denying they 
existed). 
 13. See, e.g., Audio tape: AALS 2000 Constitutional Meeting: What Brown Should Have 
Said (Jan. 5-9, 2000) (Recorded Resources Corp.). 
 14. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1334-38 (4th ed. 1975) 
(raising numerous questions about the basis of the Brown holding). 
 15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Brown overruled a part of Plessy that was essential to it, though ac-
tually Brown did not quite overrule Plessy.  See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
54 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter “FARBER”]. 
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larly elected United State Supreme Court, declaring that the law stands 
against all these august legislatures.16 
The moderator and apparently the originator of the idea for the pan-
el, Professor Balkin, said Brown created a jurisprudential crisis.17  The 
nature of this crisis was not disclosed, but we would venture, Brown was 
a case that seemed to be decided correctly morally (after all to openly 
defend apartheid is not a lot of fun) but was out of synch with the juris-
prudential theories then in vogue.  For example, it proved hard to recon-
cile with the Harvard Legal Process theory,18 which preached reliance on 
the popularly elected officials instead of a strong role for the Supreme 
Court.19  Brown dealt a substantial blow to the Harvard-based Legal 
Process School.20 
3.  Guidelines of the Panel 
The AALS Panel was composed of distinguished academic partici-
pants charged with the task of rewriting the Brown opinion, as it should 
have been written.  The Panel was directed to rethink the premises of 
Brown, and in that process the Panelists could consider current theories 
of interpretation (whatever those are).  And the Panelists could refer to 
current ideas about constitutional equality (maybe our ideas about equal-
ity have improved, who knows?) with the view in mind of casting Brown 
in a more felicitous light.21 
This is at first blush confusing.  The Panelists cannot use any cases 
or statutes written after 1954, but can consider what we have learned 
about interpretation and about equality since then (!).  Well, all right, 
learning does not stop, and perhaps the note of optimism about “theories 
of interpretation” and “knowledge” about equality is the best way to 
go.22  No Panelist obeyed the instructions concerning a current theory of 
interpretation and current developments in equality theory.23  For exam-
                                                          
 16. FARBER, supra note 15, at 55 (Congress could have overruled de jure segregation at the 
District of Columbia level). 
 17. See Professor Balkin, Address at the 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting (Jan. 5-
9, 2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 195 
(Recorded Resources Corp.). 
 18. This Process theory was already fairly well established in the 1950’s. See NEIL DUXBURY, 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 207 (1995) [hereinafter DUXBURY]. 
 19. See infra note 38. 
 20. The Harvard Legal Process School was unable to come to terms with Warren Court activ-
ism but attitudes of that School  lived on.  See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 208. 
 21. See supra note 13. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
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ple, a current theory of interpretation might be postmodernism, but no 
one referred to that.24  Nor did anyone refer, specifically at least, to a 
theory of equality that was not present in 1954.  The Panelists talked a 
lot about equality but it was not related to post-Brown knowledge.25 
4.  Summary Critique of the Panel 
The law professors instructed to play Supreme Court Justices were 
very competent in their enterprise.  Constitutional provisions were cited, 
including ones that the Court did not refer to, precedents were assem-
bled; even the thrust of the famous social psychology footnote was sal-
vaged and reaffirmed.26  There were also references to policy arguments 
citing in some instances to the briefs that made them.27 
Dissonance arises, however, between previous jurisprudential writ-
ings and the Panelists’ mode of delivery, which was formalism or posi-
tivism; the Panel’s implicit or explicit affirmation of a formalist method-
ological orthodoxy stands in stark tension with Panelists’ former 
writings.28  We use the terms formalism and positivism interchangeably 
to refer to a rule or standard oriented approach.  The basic idea is that 
legal decisions are controlled by, and answers found, in preexisting rules 
and standards.29  We use the term methodological orthodoxy to refer to 
the idea that legal disputes can indeed be appropriately decided by refer-
ence to answers found in an agreed upon set of materials, usually writ-
ten, which contain those answers.  In Christian theological disputes this 
methodological orthodoxy would be illustrated where reference by offi-
cials would be to the Scripture and clerical comment on the Scripture.  In 
other words, the Panelists affirmed the basic premise that the canon, 
with the help of reason, resolves the controversy.30  Canon, here, we 
would define, as a reference to what sources is appropriate for the reso-
                                                          
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11 (1954).  This footnote, number 11, 
cited psychologists to the effect that state imposed segregation led to a feeling of inferiority of 
Blacks, which retards their ability to learn. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. For reaffirmation of this 
footnote, see Professor Ely, Address at the 2000 AALS Annual Constitutional Meeting (Jan. 5-9, 
2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 196 
(Recorded Resources Corp.) and infra Ely section III D. 
 27. See Professor Bell, Address at the 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting (Jan. 5-9, 
2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 196 
(Recorded Resources Corp.). 
 28. See infra section III. 
 29. See, e.g., John W. Van Doren, An Attack on a Defense of Modern Positivism, 25 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 813, 815 (1991). 
 30. For examples of the canon referred to, see infra section III. 
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lution of legal disputes. 
That Brown could be resolved so easily is inconsistent with the 
strong reactions inspired by Brown from the participants in the Harvard 
Law School Holmes Lectures.  Lecturers in that series were preoccupied 
with Brown, and the Warren Court, which produced it.  Professor Her-
bert Wechsler,31 Judge Learned Hand,32 and Professor Alexander Bick-
el,33 struggled mightily, but even these luminaries were unable to pre-
vent the downward drift of the Legal Process School.34  Herbert 
Wechsler attacked Brown, arguing that the Court decided the case with-
out reference to neutral principles.35 Learned Hand criticized Brown also 
on a similar basis, and suggested that judicial review should, with some 
exceptions, be at an end.36 Finally, Professor Alexander Bickel found 
that in some cases, such as racial segregation cases, there is tension be-
tween principle and expediency, and therefore the only appropriate 
choice for the Court was to practice prudence and refrain from judicial 
review.37  In sum, as illustrated by the above lecturers, the prevailing ju-
risprudence of the Brown era was based on positivism or formalism, 
with its attendant stare decisis prop, and a faith in reasoned elaboration 
premised explicitly or implicitly on an assertion of the primacy of elect-
ed bodies over a non-elected court.38 
The drift of the AALS Panel, with very few exceptions, was that re-
sort to the canon and legal analogical reasoning, formalism and legal 
positivism were up to the task of justifying legal decisions, presumably 
of any type or nature.39  It was a surprise to see most of the participants 
adopt the formalist mode, e.g., Professor Catharine MacKinnon, Profes-
sor Derrick Bell, even Professors Bruce Ackerman and Frank Michael-
man.  Professor Bell, who distanced himself from positivism the most, at 
                                                          
 31. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15, 34 (1959) [hereinafter “WECHSLER”]. 
 32. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Harvard Univ. Press 1958). 
 33. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 283 (Bickel lectured in 1969). 
 34. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 282 (erosion began with Warren Court). 
 35. See WECHSLER, supra note 31.  Such neutral principles transcend the immediate result 
and therefore are not just fashioned to obtain a particular result. See id. at 15 (neutral principles 
stand in contrast to ad hoc use of principle to achieve a particular result). 
 36. See HAND, supra note 11, at 652-72. 
 37. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 279 (1995) (there is no neat dividing line between prin-
ciple and expediency therefore where there is this conflict potential, courts (as in Brown), should 
refrain from acting). Id. at 279-80. 
 38. See DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 288 (Bickel referred to this problem as one of the coun-
ter-majoritarianism: unconstitutional ruling reverses policy of elected representatives).  Stare decisis 
is a legal concept that past decisions should be honored and determine the results in future cases. 
 39. Cf. supra note 13. 
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one point, invoked “the Constitution” as an important standard support-
ing his argument.40 
In attempting to come to terms with the significance of the Panel, 
we look to parallels in the realm of theological controversy.  One of us 
has pursued such broad parallels before,41 and Professor Balkin and oth-
er commentators have followed this course in other legal contexts.42  To 
pursue this analogy, we look to the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE, where 
bishops assembled to determine orthodoxy in religious doctrine.  For at 
Nicaea, there was an endorsement of a legitimacy of a methodological 
orthodoxy. The methodological orthodoxy arose from the use of Scrip-
ture, and the integration of material from bishops and other clerical 
commentators.43 
In other words, the Panel used traditional sources, e.g., the Consti-
tution and cases, and thereby endorsed them in the form of a rule of 
recognition, to use the term of H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism. The rule 
of recognition is a rule derived from observation of what sources deci-
sion makers refer to in resolving controversies.44  The methodological 
orthodoxy centered on a universal emphasis on the Constitution, cases 
construing it, and other formal sources selectively chosen including State 
and Supreme Court cases, and by surprise, even the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.45  Just as at Nicaea, we can see the secular bishops of our day, 
perhaps striving consciously or unconsciously, for a validation of appro-
priate sources or a canon for the determination of controversy.  The poli-
tics of legitimation, status, prestige and power are at stake now as in 325 
CE.  Also in tandem with Nicaea, the Brown panelists reached a consen-
sus on the result.46 
But there are other stories that come out of this exercise by the pan-
el of secular bishops.  One is disarray and contradiction arising out of the 
cacophony of panel opinions, proceeding from the canon, leading the 
                                                          
 40. See Bell, supra note 27. 
 41. See John W. Van Doren, Contradiction and Legitimacy in Christianity and United States 
Constitutionalism, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 637 (1989). 
 42. See Balkin, infra section III A. 
 43. See LEO DONALD DAVIS, S.J., THE FIRST SEVEN ECUMENICAL COUNCILS 69-77 (1987) 
(gospels and apostolic writing used at Nicaea as a basis for dogma which evolved) [hereinafter 
“COUNCILS”]. 
 44. See John W. Van Doren, An Attack on a Defense of Modern Positivism, 25 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 813, 815 (1991) (discussing Hart’s Rule of Recognition).  The comparison could be made of 
cases to clerical commentary and apostolic writings, though for our purpose it is more important to 
find some rule of recognition of appropriate sources, rather than worry about exact parallels be-
tween cases and clerical commentary. 
 45. See discussion of panelists infra section II. 
 46. See supra note 13. 
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panel toward self-destruction.47 Since there are no records of the meeting 
at Nicaea, the bishops were spared this exercise in contradiction.48  Sec-
ondly, as mentioned above, there is substantial conflict between the for-
malism or positivism implicit in the opinions and the previous written 
positions of the panelists we discuss, which refute and question severely 
the positivist frame.49  We now proceed to our parallel with the Council 
of Nicaea. 
II.  PARALLEL TO THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA 
A.  History of the Council 
In 325 CE, the Council of Nicaea, summoned by the Emperor Con-
stantine I, met in Nicaea to deal with a crisis in another community, this 
time, overtly at least, traceable to religious controversy over the nature 
of the Godhead.50 What is the relationship between God and Jesus?  Was 
there a time when Jesus did not exist?  Was Jesus of a different sub-
stance than God or the same substance?  Relatedly, was Jesus subordi-
nate to God?  And where does the Emperor fit in?  Is he bound by law 
set by the Church, or is he the source of all law so that his law would 
prevail over contrary Church law?  It was this latter controversy that 
contributed to the later repudiation of the homoousios doctrine, which 
stated that God and Jesus were of the same substance, because it limited 
the power and authority of the Emperor.51  This dispute, stirred up in the 
Scriptural context, was settled by reference to an extra-Scriptural source, 
the Greek language idea of homoousios. There was resistance to this 
term for several reasons.  Some eastern bishops did not like the uncer-
tainty that homoousios might generate. Conservatives did not like im-
porting terms from outside the sacred text.52 This controversy prefigures 
the originalist vs. non-interpretivist debates in jurisprudence.  At Nicaea, 
the Council found God and Jesus were of one substance, so that it was 
then possible to identify as heresies the claim that Jesus was subordinate 
to God, and the Arian claim that there was a time when Jesus did not ex-
ist.  Since God and Jesus were of the same substance, there was no time 
when Jesus “was not.”  But the decision did not come without extreme 
                                                          
 47. See IB, infra. 
 48. COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 59 (official minutes did not survive, if they were taken). 
 49. See infra section III. 
 50. See COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 51-56. 
 51. See id., supra note 43, at 74-77. 
 52. Id. at 62. 
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controversy.53 
The final resolution at Nicaea, based on homoousios, had sufficient 
ambiguity to gain assent, but at the same time involved a contradiction, 
which later accommodated substantial controversy.54  There are broad 
significant parallels between the Council of Nicaea and the AALS Panel.  
Both sought to be ecumenical, that is, sought to have the appearance of 
representing diverse regional and political components. The Council 
meeting at Nicaea had delegate bishops from the western and eastern 
sections of the Church. 
In the AALS Panel on Brown, we encountered the ruling “secular 
bishops” of this day, the law professors, largely from the Harvard, Yale, 
Columbia axis, yet another Trinity.  For there they were, addressing a 
leading controversy of our lifetime, apartheid in America, spinning out 
their legal scripture from the Constitution and its commentators and le-
galists in cases. They had the same problems as the bishops at Nicaea. 
To what extent can an ancient text bear the crucial job of exegesis to 
solve problems of the day which find their way into the legal sphere?  
And to what extent must the secular bishops (law professors and Su-
preme Court Justices) give way to forces outside the text, such as policy, 
morals, and politics to resolve those crises? 
                                                          
 53. See generally, supporting this paragraph, id. at 33-80.  “The word homoousios had a long 
history. . .even though accepted in the creed, it was objectionable to the majority of the bishops for 
at least four reasons.  First, the term, despite Constantine’s statement, had strong materialist over-
tones which would connote that Father and Son are parts or separable portions of the same “stuff”.  
Secondly, if Father and Son were of one numerically identical substance, then the doctrine of the 
creed could well be Sabellian, Father and Son being identical and indistinguishable.  Thirdly, the 
term was associated with heresies since it had been coined by the Gnostics and had, in fact, been 
condemned at the Council of Antioch in 268 as used by the Adoptionist Paul of Samosata.  Fourthly 
and importantly for many of the more conservative bishops, the term was not scriptural. 
  Despite the misgivings of perhaps the majority of the attending bishops the term was add-
ed to the creed.  It seems clear that the authority of Constantine was the main motivating force.  Yet 
behind Constantine was his long-time chief ecclesiastical advisor, Ossius of Cordoba, a bishop im-
mersed in the theology of the western church.  Though the Latin equivalent of homoousios, consub-
stantial, was not yet a fully accepted term in the western theological vocabulary, it was suited to 
describe the type of Trinitarian theology fashionable in the West with its strong insistence on the 
divine monarchy.  It is likely that in pre-consiliar discussions Ossius had gained the support of Al-
exander of Alexandria and cooperation of Constantine to urge the term on the assembled bishops.  
The very ambiguity of the word would possibly have appealed to the politician Constantine was.  
Within limits the bishops could read their own meaning into the term which still had the merit of 
scotching the Arian view.  So homoousios, coined by Gnostic heretics, proposed by an unbaptized 
emperor, jeopardized by naïve defenders, but eventually vindicated by the orthodox, was added to 
the Creed of Nicaea to become a sign of contradiction for the next half-century.”Id. at 61-62. 
 54. See id. at 94-100 (Nicene Creed with homoousios repudiated in a later council; Nicene 
Creed seems to go down to defeat).  See also HENRY CHADWICK, THE EARLY CHURCH 130-31 
(Dorset Press ed., Penguin Books Ltd. 1986) (crucial terms of the Nicene Creed did not mean the 
same thing to all the Bishops because of  the ambiguity of homoousios). 
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Whether it is appropriate to use policy as a determinant of legal 
cases today is controversial.  The modern legal positivists indicate that 
policy may play a limited role.55  But the positivist stress rules with a 
core of certainty and a presumably small penumbra of doubt.  These 
rules do not require a fresh judgment from case to case.56  The positivists 
could probably fit Brown into the “open-textured” area, where policy 
could bring resolution.57  This view contrasts with that of Dworkin who 
argues that in hard cases political morality must be invoked, and there 
are preexisting rights determinable from preexisting legal principles.58  
Dworkin deprecates the use of policies, finding reliance on it by courts 
to be wrong.59  Others, such as adherents to Professor Myres MacDou-
gal’s Policy Science would use policies that they consider determinant in 
deciding cases.60  Many jurists are reluctant to include policy in the 
equation because that smacks too much of politics and affirms legal real-
ism and relativity.  Whether there is a clear distinction between law and 
policy, or law and politics, and if not, if this can be acknowledged open-
ly in 2002, is an open question. 
There were some tensions on this even in 325 CE.  The bishops 
disputed the inclusion of the homoousios doctrine because, in part, it was 
not in the text.  The parallel between Nicaea and the Panel can be exem-
plified in another comparison.  Professor McConnell is basically an 
originalist in orientation, and Professor Ely also has originalist leanings.  
By “originalism” we mean a tendency to stress the original text of the 
Constitution as it was understood at the time of enactment.  Originalists 
are wary of the Supreme Court and wish to restrict the scope of the 
court, at least on a substantive basis.  Perforce, Professors MacKinnon 
and Balkin are not originalists.  In any event, the parallel is with the use 
of the term homoousios, which the Scriptural originalists opposed be-
                                                          
 55. See Peter Mirfield, In Defense of Modern Legal Positivism, 16 FLA. ST .U.L. REV. 985, 
989 (1989) (raising the question as to whether Hart’s system does or can be made to include “prin-
ciples,” and whether in open textured cases courts engage in a rule producing function).  See also 
H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream 
11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977) [hereinafter “Eyes”]. 
 56. See Mirfield, supra note 55, at 989; See also Eyes, supra note 55. 
 57. See Eyes, supra note 55, at 978-987 (alluding to the “open textured” area with a criticism 
of  Dworkin for arguing that there are right answers in that “hard case” area). 
 58. See generally Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 
(1982).  See also DUXBURY, supra note 18 at 293-94 (Dworkin decries use of policy, favoring the 
discovery of rights based on principle). 
 59. Eyes, supra note 55, at 982-83 (criticizing Dworkin’s emphasis on policy, which Dworkin 
finds to be a legislative not a judicial concern). 
 60. See generally W. REISMAN AND A. SCHREIBER, UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW: 
CASES, READINGS, COMMENTARY (1987). 
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cause it was not in the Scriptural text.  That the homoousios or “same 
substance” doctrine was not in the Scriptures was used as an important 
argument to reject it and the Nicene Creed at a later council.61  At Ni-
caea, Constantine had to use suasion and exile to obtain unity.62  If there 
is discord, instability, and dissent, one way to achieve unity is to expel 
the dissenters. 
There may be a parallel between the use of political power and 
court decisions and political power and the Council of Nicaea.  Constan-
tine coerced reluctant bishops presumably to obtain a unity that was im-
portant to his empire-building.  Professor Bell points out that the gov-
ernment brief written to overturn Plessy, stated that apartheid was an 
albatross on a post World War II United States, emerging as a major 
World Power.  For the new American Empire needed to influence the 
hearts and minds of the Third World, most of who were not white.  Is 
this a gentle nudge from the Constantine of our time, to go ahead with 
Brown desegregation?63 
B.  The AALS Secular Bishops 
In the AALS Panel, the secular bishops dealing with Brown came 
forth with all manner of secular doctrine: equal protection, privileges 
and immunities, the Citizenship Clause, the power of Congress to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, incorporation 
of this in that, and that in this.64 The artillery was wheeled out and put in 
place. Some members of the Panel, however, then displayed conflict 
about the appropriate canon for resolution.  Similarly, the bishops at Ni-
caea dealt with a swelter of possible interpretations of Scripture in the 
first three centuries.65  Could an audience member listening to the Panel 
not wonder if by chance she had gone to the wrong hotel and gotten into 
a conference of bickering prelates trying to declare unity and resolve a 
societal crisis?66 
It may be objected that the Panelists did not specifically adopt any 
“methodological orthodoxy,” as we suggest in section IA4, infra.  Put 
another way, what other choice did the Panelists have when they accept-
                                                          
 61. See COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 97-100 (Nicene Creed seems to be defeated). 
 62. See id. at 63 (bishops exiled who failed to sign). 
 63. See supra note 13. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 33-58. 
 66. The political pressure of Constantine, which resulted in the Nicene Creed, is an important 
lesson in how truth is established.  Those not accepting the Nicene Creed were threatened with exile 
or actually exiled.  See id. at 63. 
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ed Professor Balkin’s invitation to sit as a Supreme Court on Brown?67  
We say that by the act of participation, the Panelists at least implicitly 
affirmed the methodological orthodoxy of the canon as the source of 
resolution. The Panelists could have refused to participate.  There must 
be some panel to which they or we would not lend our presence as pan-
elists with the concomitant legitimation that may result.  What about a 
panel in praise of Nazism, did the holocaust really occur, what Dred 
Scott, Korematsu, or Bradwell v. Illinois, should have said, anti-
Semitism, “the final solution,” or advocacy of physical abuse of children 
or women so as not to spare the rod, or incest 2002, take your pick. 
The values asserted by the Panel were those of formalism of the 
H.L.A. Hart variety, reinforcing the value of the canon and methodolog-
ical orthodoxy in its use.  Moreover, the value of reason as a determinant 
was reinforced: better reason produces better results (What Brown 
Should Have Said).  This position stands in contradiction to the previous 
writings of the representative scholars we discuss with respect to legal 
methodology or jurisprudence,68 and leaves one proclaiming with Lucre-
tia, are you serious, or are you laughing at me? 
C.  The Panel’s Internal Conflicts 
The value of methodological orthodoxy affirmed by the Panel was 
undermined by the tendency of the Panel to self-destruct. While there 
was reference to the canon for resolution, the composition of the relevant 
canon and choices of doctrine from it were highly controversial.  For ex-
ample, Balkin found an equality principal in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.69 Michaelman thought there might be an equality principle 
there, but indicated that harvesting such a principle could only be done 
with a moral decision.70 Michaelman noted that such an equality provi-
sion was ignored for 75 years.71 
There was also disarray concerning which clause of the Fourteenth 
                                                          
 67. Conversation with Professor Tahirih Lee, Associate Professor of Law, Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law (on or about February 12, 2001). 
 68. Professor McConnell may provide an exception. His panel presentation is consistent with 
his previous writings. However in expanding the canon to include Congressional votes on issues 
related to the Fourteenth Amendment, and by choosing to derive the meaning of the Constitution 
from Congressional votes, he appears to engage in the shell game, result oriented tactic for which he 
condemns others.  See McConnell section, infra IIIC. 
 69. See Balkin, supra note 17. 
 70. See Professor Michaelman, Address at the 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting 
(Jan. 5-9, 2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, 
Tape 195 (Recorded Resources Corp.). 
 71. See id. 
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Amendment should govern.  Should it be the Citizenship Clause,72 or the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, or the 
clause empowering Congress to implement the Amendment, or more 
than one of those clauses? 73 McConnell and Ely argued that the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection applied only to the states.74  Ely 
denied that the Fifth Amendment incorporated the Fourteenth, and Sun-
stein held the same, but found the Fifth Amendment applied to reach the 
Federal control of the District of Columbia.  Sunstein relied on the Fifth 
Amendment without reference to any incorporation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  This created dissonance with the Brown Court’s holding 
that the Fifth Amendment incorporated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Ackerman found the Citizenship Clause could be used to find and 
enforce rights of national citizenship.  Not to be outdone, Days agreed 
that the Amendments were not quite congruent (the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment) but he supported 
an equality principle in the Citizenship Clause, which meant talent and 
achievement were the only aristocracy.75 This equality principle served 
to affirm the Brown result and the Bolling v. Sharpe extension to federal 
action.  Balkin also argued that the Citizenship Clause applies to delimit 
the Federal Government from segregation of the races.  The reasoning 
here was similar to the above arguments that making persons citizens 
creates rights of national citizenship, including a right to education for 
all citizens.  Sunstein dismissed such considerations because they were 
not argued or briefed. 76  The appropriate remedy in the Brown Panel 
was controversial, all the way from one with extreme teeth (Bell) to 
“immediate compliance.” 
Dispute continued with disagreement over whether the intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment could be known.  Days had no trouble finding 
that the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment meant that schools could 
not be segregated.  MacKinnon found the intent from an equality princi-
                                                          
 72. See id. 
 73. See Michaelman, supra note 70. 
 74. See id. Michaelman states that the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the states 
only.  See id. 
 75. For these statements, see supra note 13. 
 76. See id. Michaelman was not as sure, but may be arguing that the federal government could 
make the people citizens of both the state and federal government. But Michaelman notes two prob-
lems: the Citizenship Clause does not apply directly against the states, and if the Citizenship Clause 
gave the recipients the rights of white citizens, what were those rights?  On balance, it was doubtful 
to him that the Citizenship Clause could yield a national right to education.  Ackerman and Days 
differed with some of their colleagues on whether the Court has a duty to override legislatures in 
appropriate cases. Ackerman and Days thought yes, while Ely and McConnell stressed deference.  
See id. 
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ple, which she obtained, perhaps, from Aristotle.  She seemed critical, 
however, of the way the principle had worked out.  She was also critical 
of the interpretation of the equality principle in Aristotle’s time, a time 
in which the equality principle was found consistent with prostitution 
and slavery.  Balkin found the intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment 
uncertain.  McConnell found the debates surrounding the Fourteenth 
Amendment inconclusive, but fleshed out the intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from Congressional votes on related issues close to the time 
of ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 
Moreover, those Panelists who used cases to firm up the intent of 
the Fourteenth Amendment had some disagreement on what those cases 
were.  Some thought older state cases unhelpful, while others found 
them helpful.  When it came to United States Supreme Court cases, it 
was difficult to keep up with the variety, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, Bur-
nette, Korematsu, and a host of others.78  The kind of unity we might 
have hoped for from the Panel was belied by disagreement over what 
cases were relevant.  There was also conflict over the importance of the 
feelings of Blacks about inferiority deriving from segregation.  Ely 
thought this was important, regardless of the conflict that existed in the 
literature or which occurred at the time over the sociological footnote.79  
Law that engendered these inferiority feelings seemed crucial to 
MacKinnon,80 but to Days this was not relevant.81 
As mentioned before, another sticky point would have been, had the 
issue been raised, whether policy was relevant, and once we find our-
selves in the policy arena, what policies are relevant?  The observer must 
remain puzzled over the difference if any between “law” and policy. Is 
the question of whether “separate but equal” is inherently unequal a pol-
icy question or an issue of positive law or both?  Seemingly, it is a poli-
cy question.  This Panel, for its part, displayed varying approaches to 
whether policy was relevant, and if so, what policies.  Sunstein studious-
ly avoided any reference to policy, while Bell argues almost solely on 
the basis of policy.82 
We may wonder what the formalist panel would say about Bell’s 
very policy-oriented approach.  Would Sunstein, for example, agree with 
Bell that the United States was embarrassed in world affairs with its 
                                                          
 77. See id. for these statements. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Ely, infra III D. 
 80. See MacKinnon, infra III B. 
 81. See supra note 13. 
 82. See id. 
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apartheid policy and that this is an important consideration in the case?83 
Bell relies on the Justice Department’s brief, which made this point; 84 
the question is thus raised of whether this sort of political or policy ar-
gument is properly made in court.  Would Sunstein or the other Panelists 
agree with Bell’s argument in his opinion, that there was a tacit agree-
ment between the lower socio-economic classes and the ruling powers: 
you allow the elite managerial and owning class to maintain wage slav-
ery (Bell’s term), and we will agree to preserve your position relative to 
the subordinate position of African Americans?85 Would they rule such 
an argument “out of bounds” improperly raised in a Supreme Court 
opinion? 
Thus, the move to policy showed the Panel’s disarray further. Pro-
fessors Ackerman, Balkin, and Michaelman relied on the “unthinkable” 
rationale of Brown, but Ely, who found the “unthinkable” argument 
gives too much power to the courts, opposed them.86 The “unthinkable” 
argument used by the Brown court was that it would be unthinkable if 
the federal government in the District of Columbia could do what the 
state governments were forbidden to do, namely segregate the races in 
education.  Ely argued that some theory should be found to hold the fed-
eral government to the Brown standard.  He just thought that the “un-
thinkable argument” went too far, and criticized Michaelman for using 
that argument.  However, Ely did find that the federal government is 
bound, but was conclusionary and uninformative as to why.87 
The extent to which the canon could bear the interpretive task, and 
its composition were controversial.  Some thought the Constitution 
could bear the burden of this decision, but others doubted this.  Mich-
aelman thought the Constitution might not be able to bear the burden, 
but let us get as much out of it as we can.88  Even jurisdiction was con-
troversial.  McConnell thought, at least concerning the desegregation de-
cision in the District of Columbia, Congress intended to reserve jurisdic-
tion to itself to the exclusion of the Court. 
In sum, similar to Nicaea, the Panel exhibited disarray in determin-
ing the canon and considerable dispute as to what was appropriately de-
rivable from it.  The use of methodological orthodoxy to resolve contro-
                                                          
 83. See Bell, supra note 27. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Ely section, infra III D. Ely thought that Michaelman came “dangerously close” to 
buying the “unthinkable” argument.  See Ely, supra note 26. 
 88. See id. 
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versy was thus seriously undermined. 
III.  THE VIEWS OF THE PANELISTS 
Not only is the methodological orthodoxy as a determinant of the 
result in Brown undermined by Panel conflict, but there is further disso-
nance because the Panel’s opinions on Brown do not square with most of 
the writings of the Panelists we selected for study.  The formalism in-
volving the implicit claim that the canon produces the Brown result is at 
odds with our selected Panelists’ jurisprudence as revealed in their 
prepanel writings.  In what follows, we consider the contrast between the 
four representative Panelists and their writings. 
A.  Professor John Balkin 
As we see it, Balkin’s basic problem is that his Panel opinion is 
very formalistic, or as he might say, syncretic (pointing to one truth), but 
his previous writings display a “diachronic,” or to use his words, “multi-
ple perspective postmodern” stance.  Professor John Balkin was the 
moderator and apparently the originator of the Constitutional Law Panel, 
“How Brown Should Have Been Decided.” 
1.  What He Wrote Before 
Balkin has concerned himself with Brown frequently in elaborating 
his theories and responding to others.89  Balkin appears, at other times, 
in the discussion circles of postmodernism.  Those who espouse post-
modernism often indicate that the concept resists description.  Balkin de-
scribes it as a perception that the times in which we live are sufficiently 
unique so that different interpretations of the Constitution may be re-
quired.90 
The idea that changing times may require different Constitutional 
directions will meet with opposition from the traditionally conservative 
originalists and others, who maintain that interpretation must be limited 
to the intent of the Framers and Ratifiers, and must relate to conditions 
and mindsets at the time of making.  This could be described as a tradi-
tion snapshot theory.  Take a picture of tradition at the relevant time, and 
                                                          
 89. See, e.g, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315 n.2 (1997) [hereinafter 
“Status”]; J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
963, 999 (1998) [hereinafter “Canon”]; Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History 
(book review), 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 944 (1988) [hereinafter “History”]; What is Postmodern 
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1977 (1992) [hereinafter “Constitutionalism”]. 
 90. See Constitutionalism, supra note 89, at 1977. 
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that is the tradition adopted.  So it is not surprising that, in accordance 
with his postmodernist perspective, Balkin has also zealously denounced 
originalism.  Balkin’s criticism of originalism is that there can be no one 
intent to follow because the Ratifiers’ intentions were mixed, in that the 
Constitution was a compromise of divergent interests and intentions,91 
and accompanying moral and political viewpoints.  Furthermore, Balkin 
points out that there was no one group of Framers, since the Constitution 
has been amended, such as in 1868, 92 with, importantly here, the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
It is extremely difficult to reconcile Balkin’s postmodernism with 
the formalism of his panel presentation.  Consistent with his postmodern 
direction, Balkin has concluded that the Constitution is capable of multi-
ple interpretations and thus inherently iterable, that is, it can be read in 
different ways, depending on who the reader is.93  Balkin’s written views 
on the Constitutional tradition smack of Legal Realism, which encour-
ages us to look at law as manipulable by interpretive theory or attuned to 
conflicting policies rather than rules.  Balkin writes: “[Our] theories of 
the Constitution are makeshift attempts, reflecting the concerns of our 
era, but dressed up as timeless claims about interpretation.”94  Curiously, 
(since he comes from a different political camp), Professor McConnell 
makes a similar point.95 
According to Balkin, originalism and formalism (positivism) are 
further untenable because the constitutional canon is not just contained 
in the Constitutional document itself and Supreme Court opinions, but 
within sociological developments, such as skills, approaches, standard 
examples, forms of argument, and even stock stories.96  Balkin’s expan-
sive view, compatible with Legal Realism, if not its incarnation, is that 
public opinion more often than not leads the Supreme Court so that 
judges then “discover” new rights in the Constitution.97 
The legal system must then, according to Balkin, by its very nature, 
                                                          
 91. See History, supra note 89, at 924, where Balkin criticizes originalist Raoul Berger for not 
taking into consideration that the ratifiers had divergent interests with regard to federal and state 
power. 
 92. See id. at 942, 949 (legal system diachronic). 
 93. Id. at 933. 
 94. J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1703, 1719 (1997) [hereinafter “Agreements”]. 
 95. See Professor McConnel, Address at the 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting (Jan. 
5-9, 2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 
195 (Recorded Resources Corp.), and McConnell, section III C, infra. 
 96. See generally, Canon, supra note 89. 
 97. Id. at 1022-23 (public opinion leads the Court, at times). 
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be viewed from a diachronic perspective.98  A “diachronic perspective” 
stands for the proposition that the meaning of the Constitution is re-
quired to change over time, as legislation is created and then interpreted 
by courts. The canon is used as a vehicle “for the normalization of be-
liefs and interpretive assumptions, and hence as instruments for social 
control by the relevant interpretive community.”99 The correct interpre-
tive process, or arriving at proper law, is not easy, however, because the 
Supreme Court, warns Balkin, has done “‘wicked things” purporting to 
follow the Constitution, such as promulgate racism and sexism.100 
The wickedness, however, about which Balkin cautions his readers 
does not stop at the Supreme Court interpretations in that the Constitu-
tional document is indictable also.101  There may be limits to the use of 
the Constitution to find appropriate law, because the Constitution itself 
may be deeply flawed.  Thus, Balkin questions whether the Constitution 
itself may be “evil.”102  What Balkin means by “evil” is that the Consti-
tution contains written clauses, which provide for things that in today’s 
society are strictly taboo, for one, slavery.103  In short, the original Con-
stitution and its ratifiers supported the institution of slavery, as well as 
such “evils” as sexism.  The slave trade was, in fact, so important to the 
ratifiers that it could not be constitutionally abolished until 1808.  Balkin 
still queries if William Lloyd Garrison might not be correct in maintain-
ing that the Constitution is “a covenant with death, and an agreement 
with hell.”104 
                                                          
 98. History, supra note 89, at 930-33; Balkin contrasts the diachronic perspective with the 
conservatives’ synchronic perspective, which asserts that there is one rule of law and that rule was 
created by the Framers. Balkin’s opinion is that the synchronic and diachronic perspectives are not 
only in tension, but must go hand in hand; stare decisis flows from the simultaneous creation of new 
law.  See id.  This is puzzling, however, and appears to involve a departure from the general under-
standing of the words stare decisis. Stare decisis must be conceived as highly flexible and “dia-
chronic” itself. 
 99. Canon, supra note 89, at 1019. 
 100. Id. at 1017. 
 101. Id. at 1024. 
 102. Id. at 1023.  “What shall we do if we discover that the Constitution itself might be an evil 
document that keeps evil in place. . . .”  Id.; See also, Agreements, supra note 94, at 1704.  “[T]he 
Constitution exists in a political system that is certainly not completely just and may in fact be very 
unjust . . . . the Constitution we are faithful to might be an evil Constitution. . . .”  Id. 
 103. See Agreements, supra note 94, at 1707-08. One of the two unamendable provisions ac-
cording to Article V is that slave trade could not be abolished before 1808.  Id.  There is also the 
Fugitive Slave Clause.  Id. at 1708. 
 104. Id. Balkin also states that the Constitutional tradition causes social and psychological 
pressures of “fidelity” which have three adverse effects: we tend to see the Constitution for whatev-
er we see fit; we conform our ideas of justice to our sense of what the Constitution means; and, the 
practice of constitutional interpretation skews and limits our understanding of justice because not all 
claims are equally easy to state in the language of that tradition.  Id. at 1704. 
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Balkin’s painting of the Constitutional picture does not get signifi-
cantly prettier, or less “evil.”  He further alerts his readers that “[w]e 
cannot avoid having constitutional doctrines simply because they may 
turn out to be inadequate or imperfect.  But we can avoid believing that 
the truth about society is described within them.”105 Balkin gave as an 
example, the Fourteenth Amendment:106 it may conflict with the view of 
Lincoln himself, who once said that if he could have preserved the Un-
ion with slavery, he would have.107  The truth about society, which this 
example reveals, is that even though the Fourteenth Amendment may 
have been written in order to abolish slavery and create [formal] equality 
for Blacks, the reality is that even the President of the United States did 
not agree with it.  The Fourteenth Amendment, like the original Consti-
tutional document, was a compromise. 
Further difficulties arise for originalists who favor the result in 
Brown.  The Ratifiers, not only of the original Constitution, but also of 
the reconstruction amendments, supported slavery or subordination of 
Blacks.  Thus an originalist favoring Brown cannot realistically (or mor-
ally) be strict because he/she would have to go back and reverse Brown 
in that desegregation does not align with original intent.108 
Balkin has not given up, though.  He has to expand the canon to 
keep going.  He has maintained that the underlying truth about our Con-
stitutional government is not actually to be found in the Constitution of 
1787, but rather in the Declaration of Independence of 1776.  According 
to Balkin, the Declaration of Independence, rejected social hierarchy and 
embraced social equality.109  A small problem arises however when Bal-
kin admits that in 1776 social equality did not include women, slaves, 
and white men without property.110 
Unimpeded, Balkin heads for the stratosphere, and states that his 
conception of democracy is simply a form of social organization, which 
has not yet been fully realized.111 The American Revolution was about 
an “egalitarian urge” which was then “enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence and forms the underlying spirit of our constitutional tradi-
                                                          
 105. Status, supra note 89, at 2374. 
 106. Ratified as one of the reconstruction amendments following the Civil War. 
 107. Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4-SPG Widener L. Symp. J. 167, 
168 (1999) [hereinafter “Declaration”] (citing Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley 
(Aug. 22, 1862), reprinted in THE PORTABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN 234 (Andrew Delbanco ed., 
1992)). 
 108. See History, supra note 89, at 944. 
 109. Declaration, supra note 107, at 171-72. 
 110. Id at 172. 
 111. Status, supra note 89, at 2314-15. 
19
MacGrady and Van Doren: Another Council of Nicaea?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
MACGRADY1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:50 PM 
390 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: 3/4 
tion.”112  Therefore, according to Balkin, the Constitution must not be 
read by its individual clauses, but as a “respons[e] to social movements 
demanding changes in social structure.”113 
Balkin persists.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause 
is understood to reflect an overarching democratic goal of eliminating 
social hierarchy.114  In effect, Balkin is able to cite it in support of his 
thesis that we should strive for “Ideal Constitutionalism.”  That is, “we 
must try to see the true and good things in it.”115  From that, presumably, 
comes good constitutional law. 
Balkin’s ideas of an underlying democratic plan and Ideal Constitu-
tionalism may perhaps appear to flow nicely into his postmodernist per-
spective.  He finds that there is a choice and we must look at constitu-
tional law in light of the realities of society today.  But Balkin actually 
creates a sticky Cartesian Circle, which might otherwise be referred to as 
a loop, for himself.  He has stated that certain constitutional cases have 
been wrongly interpreted.116  Here we have to pause and ask ourselves, 
when someone says, “this case is wrong,” what standards are they using?  
Balkin may be telling us that the original Constitutional document or, 
constitutional tradition does contain a specific answer and judges in the 
past got it wrong.  Or, it may be that all this hype about a diachronic per-
spective and appreciating history is just hype; it’s really synchronic.  Fi-
nally, he may be telling us that his views are “true and good” while oth-
ers are “wicked” or “evil.” 
Though Balkin is admittedly left-liberal,117 he does not seem to 
have any trouble using the traditionally conservative order of morality; 
i.e., there is fundamentally a “good” versus “evil.”  Balkin has specifi-
cally compared differences in legal reasoning to religion.118  The religion 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 2316. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 2347. 
 115. Agreements, supra note 94, at 1709. 
 116. See, e.g.  id., where Balkin states that Dred Scott (holding that Blacks are not citizens) 
was decided wrongly. 
 117. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 
YALE L.J. 1935, 1944 (1995) (book review), “. . .I want to focus primarily on the discourse of left-
liberals, because it is the ideological community in which both Sunstein and I (and a great many 
other legal academics) are located.”  Id. 
 118. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Getting Serious about “Taking Legal Reasoning Seri-
ously,” 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543, 556 (1999).  Balkin discusses lawyer- economists and doctrinal-
ists with an analogy to religious groups.  Id. at 556-58.  Syncretic religions, like the lawyer- econo-
mists, accept alien influences. The syncretic religions think they are correct because they embrace 
the other religion, while the religion which is not syncretic believes it is correct for the opposite rea-
son.  Id. 
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analogy was intended to show that there are simply different ways to 
perceive what is correct legal reasoning, like there are different ways to 
perceive what is correct religious faith.  Yet, in the end, it is unavoidable 
and indeed necessary that each group will maintain that its system is the 
true one.119  An example is the Council of Nicaea; once the Nicene 
Creed was established, the “Arian heresy” group split off, each group 
thinking they were correct.  In other words, there are two fundamentally 
different legal theorist groups of constitutional interpretation, and neither 
will ever come to terms with the other.  The originalists and the nonin-
terpretivists cannot accept the other. 
Balkin does not appear to have a problem, philosophically, with this 
split.  His writings purport to encourage self-reflection of ideological 
differences.  He knows that there are originalists, and that he is not one 
of them.  He has, in fact, played his faithful “religious” role and decried 
the opposing religion, originalism, as heresy.  In his writings, Balkin has 
affirmed the importance of the internal point of view, but unlike some 
others, he problematizes internal perspective.120  Yet at the same time, 
Balkin invites us to view all interpretations as subjectively based, and 
therefore subject to critical perspective: “In both what we call legal un-
derstanding and what we assign to legal misunderstanding, the subject 
has already intruded and brought her fore-understandings, prejudgments 
and psychological needs to bear.  The subject is already part of the con-
structed object of interpretation; her invisibility is already reflected in 
the object’s nature.”121 
So, before Balkin arrives at the Brown panel, where does that leave 
him? It appears to leave him philosophically content with his own “in-
ternal experience of the law,” for it is not “wicked” or “evil” (he does 
not support such evils as racism and sexism).  It leaves him in the “reli-
gion” of the nonoriginalists or noninterpretivists whose postmodern pur-
pose it is to take the diachronical law handed to them from history and 
apply it to today’s society.  Apparently, the only mandatory constitution-
al or precedential authority is an amorphous democratic ideal and goal of 
rejecting social hierarchy.  Balkin wants us to remember that what the 
Supreme Court has said in the past is never unequivocally important.  
Judges have made mistakes, because they generally only answer to the 
demands of the public, not the constitutional governmental framework.  
                                                          
 119. Id. 
 120. See J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legalist Subject and the Prob-
lem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L. J. 105, 110-11 (1993) (contrasting his view with Hart and 
Dworkin who do not make problematic the internal viewer). 
 121. Id. at 111. 
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In fact, it is in many cases better to ignore what the actual Constitution 
or the Supreme Court (or the originalists) have said, because they have 
been known to inculcate “evil.”  And even if the constitutional provi-
sions are not actually evil, many of them are, at least, for sure, stupid.122 
2.  And What He Says Now 
Sitting as the Chief Justice on the Panel, Professor Balkin weighs in 
at the podium announcing that segregation is unlawful.  He described 
Brown as a “legal classic” and an “icon,” which was a Rorschach test for 
institutional theory, an interesting point not pursued directly by him or 
any other panelist.  He further stated that Brown meant different things 
to different people.  It was appropriate, he continued, to consider 
Brown’s effectiveness since the results are mixed and the public schools 
remain largely segregated today.  No one seriously pursued that topic ei-
ther.  The Panelists were to look at contemporary theories and contem-
porary concerns, but subject to the rule of the game that you knew then 
in 1954, what you know now about the “course of history of this coun-
try.” 
First, in his panel offering, Professor Balkin indicated that he con-
siders the actual intent of those responsible for the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to be inconclusive, acknowledging that others on the Panel did not 
agree.  Professors Mackinnon, Days, Bell and Ely for starters, he might 
have added, had no problem with this intent situation.  If the intent is un-
clear, we are then apparently free to find an intent “out there.”  So, there 
is a bit of tension here between Balkin’s assertion that the Framers and 
Ratifiers did not wish to outlaw segregation, and his claim that the intent 
was unclear. 
But Balkin finds the intent unclear, so we may initially think that 
must be because segregation violates the democratic ideal and goal of 
social equality.  For, after all, that is what Balkin had always asserted 
was the most (or only) important and reliable feature of the Constitu-
tional tradition.  But, no.  Balkin now tells us that segregation is uncon-
stitutional based not only on the Framers’ intent behind the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but also on substantive, structural, and textual grounds.  
Suddenly, Balkin is reaching outside his postmodernistic, diachronical 
world to find that the Framers’ intent did not support segregation.  
Though Balkin concedes that it is at best, inconclusive whether the Rati-
fiers’ of the Fourteenth Amendment intended segregation to be constitu-
                                                          
 122. See generally J.M. Balkin, The Constitution as a Box of Chocolates, 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 147 (1995). 
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tional, he goes on to argue that the basic principle behind the Amend-
ment is equal citizenship.  To the Ratifiers, however, equal citizenship 
for Blacks meant civic equality (e.g., testifying in court), but not politi-
cal (e.g., voting) or social equality.  Social equality certainly could not 
have been intended, Balkin tells us, because many of the Ratifers wanted 
Blacks to remain inferior for all time.  Despite their prejudice, however, 
Balkin reassures us they had the foresight to use language that “con-
veyed full and unalloyed equality.”123 
Balkin then informs us that even though the Ratifiers may have on-
ly intended Blacks to have civic equality, they soon were given, at least 
formally, political and social equality by courts.124 Under Plessy, how-
ever, social equality meant “separate but equal” was the order of the day.  
The states, up to that point and especially thereafter, continued to sup-
port and enforce social subordination of the Blacks.  Nonetheless, the 
Ratifiers’ intent that Blacks would only be allowed civic, but not politi-
cal and social, equality was becoming unworkable and, ultimately, ex-
ploded. (Presumably this explosion was only coincidental to the “fore-
sight” of the Ratifiers’ language because it was factors other than that 
language that gave rise to the realization.  In other words, the law 
changed not based on any clear “foresight” of the Constitution’s lan-
guage but because of social factors.  It would thus seem that the Consti-
tution was not so clear after all, or if changes were in line with the Con-
stitution it was not because anyone had cared how clear the language 
was.). 
Then Balkin introduces the Declaration of Independence and Jack-
sonian principles against class legislation to support the idea that equali-
ty of citizenship is inherent to our constitutional government.  The 
Framers were not only against privileges for special groups, but against 
disadvantages for certain groups.  This, apparently, trumps any equivo-
cation in the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  Education, moreover, is a 
fundamental interest, and states have an affirmative duty to provide 
equal education for all citizens when they subsidize public education.  
Balkin does not refer to the word “education” in the Constitution.  The 
finding of education as a fundamental interest nicely takes care of San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), 
which denied that school districts had to achieve some parity in educa-
tion resource allocation.  Rodriquez would be reversed because educa-
                                                          
 123. See Balkin, supra note 17. 
 124. Id.  Balkin cites Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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tion resources should be equalized because of a nebulous Constitutional. 
On Bolling v. Sharp, the case involving federal discrimination in 
schooling in the District of Columbia, Balkin then had one structural and 
three textual arguments to support the assertion that the federal govern-
ment cannot segregate any more than the states can.  His structural ar-
gument was that “it means little” and “makes no sense” if the states can-
not segregate, but the federal government can.  For this he cites the First 
Amendment, which states that Congress shall make no law abridging the 
freedom of speech, which, according to written material from the Uni-
versity of Minnesota, means that the Executive and Judicial branches 
cannot make such law, either.  He does not tell us what special authority 
the University of Minnesota had.125 
Then he starts reading the constitutional text, something which he 
has warned his readers against doing because, let us recall, it may be 
evil, or if not, plainly stupid.  First, he argues that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause’s reference to all persons are citizens creates a na-
tional citizenship and implies equality.  Second, he announces that the 
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “all persons born 
or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States” has 
major significance.  This, apparently, is another obvious clue about na-
tional citizenship and its implied equal citizenship.  It does not permit 
two classes of citizenship.  (It also does not prohibit it, but Balkin ig-
nores this).  Third, the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, “as we all 
know,” includes the concept of equal protection.  (Professor Ely does not 
“know this” and strenuously resisted it during the Panel discussion).  
This was done to “make explicit to the Southern states what was already 
implicit”——they cannot treat Blacks as second-class citizens.  Balkin 
gives us no cite for this, either. 
Setting aside the question of whether Balkin should or could actual-
ly believe any of these arguments, the larger issue is, given his paper 
trail and what it says, whether Balkin is acting like his enemies——the 
originalist, the positivist, or the formalist.  He has always warned his 
readers that this form of legal reasoning is illogical, evil, stupid, or just 
plain wrong.  He has told us that the Ratifiers embraced slavery and so-
cial subordination of Blacks, so be wary of them.  He has told us that the 
Supreme Court makes mistakes and generally follows public opinion, 
not the Constitution.  He has told us that the rule of law is diachronical, 
and changes with time, so do not look too far into the past for a syn-
chronic answer. And yet, what is he doing now?  He is reading Supreme 
                                                          
 125. See Balkin, supra note 17. 
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Court cases, and citing to them, even favorably.126 He is telling us, on 
the one hand, that the intent of the Ratifiers was to promote equality of 
citizenship, but on the other hand that many of them wanted Blacks to be 
forever subordinate (?!).  He is reading the text of the Constitution, ver-
batim, and telling us that it supports that intention. 
What is Balkin doing?  One would find it hard to believe that he 
could go so far as to contradict everything he has ever written as true 
about the rule of law, legal reasoning, and society.  His former writings 
remain antithetical to his panel opinion.  Perhaps the answer is that Bal-
kin is trying to set an example for us, showing us how Supreme Courts, 
“with their peculiar brand of justice,”127 “discover”128 constitutionality to 
support what their surrounding society demands. 
Perhaps, we are invited to take home the message that today, even 
though when Brown was actually decided the opposite was true, it is uni-
formly (or at least formally) strictly taboo, immoral, even evil, to advo-
cate segregation or racial discrimination. Therefore, the Brown Panel 
(and the Supreme Court) had to find segregation unconstitutional.  There 
was no choice, other than what would come down to virtual banishment.  
It is reminiscent of what the Council of Nicaea may well have been 
thinking: Our society demands that we stand together on this one, so we 
must do so, no matter what the text actually says, no matter what we 
ourselves have said or believed before. 
Perhaps an important lesson here is the fragile nature of orthodoxy.  
Brown was not bathed in orthodoxy when it was rendered.  It was highly 
controversial.  In the parallel arena of religion, Borges reminds us of the 
fragile nature of orthodoxy.  In controversies precedent to the Council of 
Nicaea in 325 CE over the relation of Jesus to God, Borges tells us the 
story of an original orthodoxy which Bishops John and Aurelian had 
embraced.  They were rivals and Aurelian wrote a better defense of the 
current orthodoxy than John, according to the ruling church authorities.  
In writing the attack on heresy, Aurelian stated the orthodoxy and his 
refutation became the Church’s official one.  Later, orthodoxy complete-
ly changed, and John used Aurelian’s statement of the old orthodoxy in 
his (John’s) refutation.  This cost Aurelian his life when John was asked 
                                                          
 126. Such as Strauder, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), which gave blacks the right to sit on juries, and 
Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which said Blacks had social equality. He cites these as evidence that 
the distinction between civic and political equality became untenable, and ultimately exploded. 
 127. See Introduction, 2000 AALS Constitutional Annual Meeting (Jan. 5-9, 2000) in AALS 
2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 195 (Recorded Re-
sources Corp.). 
 128. See Canon, supra note 89, at 1023. 
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to disclose where he got the statement of the old orthodoxy, (which was 
now heresy) and he identified his rival, Aurelian.129   
Perhaps also the Panelists were reflecting a need to stand together 
on an important societal issue.  Could there be a similarity between the 
legitimacy of religion to the bishops at Nicaea and the legitimacy of “our 
lady the common law” to the Panelists?  Otherwise our ability to slide in 
our own values could be jeopardized if that legitimacy is undermined. 
B.  Professor Catherine MacKinnon 
Professor MacKinnon’s conflicted positions are illustrated by the 
following in capsule form.  On the one hand, her Panel opinion adopts 
formalism to approve Brown, finding objective harm to Blacks from de-
segregation.  But to do so, she smuggles in her own equality principle 
taken supposedly from Aristotle, though her writings distance herself 
from the working out of that principle in Aristotle’s time and presently.  
Further, her writings suggest that law is manipulated by dominant males 
to make that world comfortable for them, and whatever the powerless 
(like Blacks and women) get is offhand, and designed to keep them hop-
ing for more, which is not likely to be forthcoming under the current 
dispensation.  MacKinnon stands delicately poised between the contra-
diction of accepting the fruits of Court action (Brown) and rejecting it 
because it is male dominated and can be used by the dominant class to 
keep women hoping for good results thereby legitimating it. 
1.  What She Wrote Before 
Catharine MacKinnon’s candidacy as a Brown Panelist may stem 
from the frequency with which she has compared women’s situation to 
that of Blacks, often citing Brown and the problem of racial discrimina-
tion in her previous writings,130 which have predominantly been in the 
                                                          
 129. See JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Theologians, in COLLECTED FICTIONS (1998). 
 130. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 44, 167 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. “The best attempt at grasping women’s situation 
in order to change it by law has centered on an analogy between sex and race in the discrimination 
context.”; Id. at 167, “Consider this analogy with race: if you see Black people as different, there is 
no harm to segregation; it is merely a recognition of that difference. . . .  Similarly, if you see wom-
en as just different, even or especially if you don’t know that you do, subordination will not look 
like subordination at all, much less like harm.  It will merely look like an appropriate recognition of 
the sex difference” (attacking neutral principles); Id. at 178, “In [Brown], it took one study to show 
that the harm of segregation was that it affected the hearts and minds of Black children, gave them a 
sense of their inferiority, and affected their feeling of status in the community in a way that was un-
likely ever to be undone.  How do you suppose it affects the hearts and minds of women. . . .” (argu-
ing that as done for Blacks in Brown, studies need to be done for women in pornography); Id. at 
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feminist field. She has based her arguments for sex equality on the same 
premises which have been used for race equality: “The primary point of 
reference for antidiscrimination law has not been the social situation and 
experience of women, but that of black Americans, or at least of black 
men.”131  While this analogy with blacks may have seemingly made her 
an opportune Panelist, her Brown opinion resonates of originalism and 
formalism, spawning a tension with her understanding of history, socie-
ty, law, and the legal system.  In her writings, she has maintained that 
throughout U.S. history, society and its law have always been, and still 
are, intrinsically unequal because only white (property-holding) males 
have made, and essentially still do make, the rules.  Our Constitutional 
tradition has never been one of equality.132  Throughout her writings, the 
                                                          
202; CATHERINE A. MACKINNON TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE.  (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1989) [hereinafter “TOWARD”], 153, “[P]erhaps it would help to think of women’s sexuality 
as women’s like Black culture is Blacks’ . . . .”; 240 (discussing how law occasionally sides with the 
powerless, citing Brown); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION.  (Yale Univ. Press 1979) [hereinafter “HARASSMENT”], 
“Segregation is more or less accepted as a dirty word when applied to separation on the basis of 
race. . . .  But there seems to be a social sense that it is somehow appropriate, or at least not without 
some just foundation, to divide labor according to sex.”; Id. at 17. “A parallel with race illustrates 
the difficulty with the distinction between the personal and the social implicit in these cases. . . .  
The assumption that relations between women and men occur in a personal sphere is directly analo-
gous to the assumption once held by whites who lived in intimate daily contact with blacks. . . .  By 
analogy to race, the fact that a sexual relation between a woman and a man is felt to be personal 
does not exempt it from helping to perpetuate women’s subordinate place in the workplace and in 
society as a whole.”; Id. at 88-89. “Often when courts are confronted with a massive social problem 
which has been ignored, the first response is ‘administrative’ concern for the legal system. . . .  The 
same can be said for women’s legal rights as a whole and of the rights of racial and national minori-
ties.”  Id. at 97; See supra note 122.  “The candid admission that women are regarded as inferior 
parallels the assessment in Plessy of skin color as property. . . .  To apply Blackstone’s analysis in a 
racial context, a property interest in an inferior defines the institution of slavery.”  HARASSMENT, 
supra note 130, at 169.  “[Attitudes towards women and women in the workplace] resembl[e] the 
white supremacist logic of of depriving blacks of the tools of an education . . .”  Id. at 196. (arguing 
race equality law should be the basis of sex equality law)  Id. at 137; (comparing women, as blacks, 
to white men)  Id. at 273 n.87 (citations omitted). 
 131. HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 127 (citations omitted). 
 132. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) 
[hereinafter ONLY WORDS], (“Originally, of course, the Constitution contained no equality guaran-
tee. . . .  [T]he First Amendment has grown as if a committment to speech were no part of a com-
mittment to equality and as if a committment to equality had no implications for the law of 
speech—as if the upheaval that produced the Reconstruction Amendments did not move the ground. 
. . .”  Id.; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law [hereinafter “Reflec-
tions”], 100 YALE L. J. 1281 (1991). “Equality was not mentioned in the Constitution or the Bill of 
Rights.” Id. at 1282. “No woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the so-
cial order under which women, as well as men, live.” Id. at 1281.  “In the United states, many men 
were also excluded from the official founding process.  African American men and women were 
considered property.  Indigenous peoples were to be subdued rather than consulted.  Non-property 
owners were not qualified to participate in most states.” Id. at 1281 n. 2. (citing C. BEARD, AN 
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elemental cry has been: Equality for women is inequality.133 
MacKinnon has heralded that the liberal state is founded upon 
(white) male supremacy,134 which has been jurisprudentially rein-
forced.135  “Male power is systemic.  Coercive, legitimated, and epistem-
ic, it is the regime.”136  Laws are by and for men.  Those with power, 
usually men, write Constitutions and laws which become precedent; 
courts cannot and do not go beyond their designated scope, unable to 
scrutinize the underlying substance of legislation.137  The world, 
MacKinnon has informed us, “actually arranges itself to affirm what the 
powerful want to see.”138  The powerful, of course, are male.  The law 
those males make are only words.139 
The male point of view is adopted as the “gender equality” stand-
ard.140  Male dominance is kept “invisible and legitimate” through 
                                                          
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 64-72 (1913))  
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 36 (discussing that what is male defines everything in 
society and history);  Id.  “[T]he principle of equality has been interpreted to affirm specific white 
and male cultural values as ‘the standard’ . . . .  Equality has come to mean a right to be treated like 
the white man when you can show you are like him.”  Id. at 63.  “[P]resumptions [that] underlie the 
First Amendment do not apply to women. . . .”  Id. at 129. (discussing pornography); “[T]he obscen-
ity standard—in this it is not unique—is built on what the male standpoint sees.”  Id. at 148; “[W]e 
can’t tell much about the intent of the framers with regard to the question of women’s speech, be-
cause I don’t think we crossed their minds.”  Id. at 195.  “The First Amendment was written by 
those who already had the speech; they also had slaves, many of them, and owned women.”  
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 204.  “[Women] were let into [the legal] profession on 
the implicit condition that we would enforce the real rules: women kept out and down, sexual access 
to women enforced.”  Id. at 205.  “For women [the ‘negative liberty’ posture which is ‘a cornerstone 
of the liberal state’] means that those domains in which women are distinctively subordinated are 
assumed by the Constitution to be the domain of freedom . . . .  Equality, in the words of Andrea 
Dworkin, was tacked on to the Constitution with spit and a prayer.  And, let me also say, late.”  Id. 
at 207; TOWARD, supra note 130, at 182 (discussing that rape law is defined as how men see it, 
not women); HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 131 “Women’s specific historical forms of subor-
dination . . . have yet to be the subject of a constitutional prohibition.”  Id. 
 133. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 171 “[T]he view that basically 
the sexes are equal in this society remains unchallenged and unchanged.  The day I got this was the 
day I understood its real message, its real coherence: This is equality for us.”  Id. 
 134. TOWARD, supra note 130,  at 162 (“The liberal state coercively and authoritatively consti-
tutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender—through its legitimating norms, forms, rela-
tion to society, and substantive policies.”). 
 135. Id. at 163 (“The state is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of 
male power on the relation between law and society.  This stance is especially vivid in constitutional 
adjudication, thought legitimate to the degree it is neutral on the policy content of legislation.”). 
 136. Id. at 170. 
 137. Id. at 238. 
 138. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech“”, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1985) [hereinafter “Pornography”]. 
 139. Id. at 65.  See generally ONLY WORDS, supra note 132. 
 140. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 221.  MacKinnon opposes Weschler’s neutral principles.  
See, e.g., Pornography, supra note 138, at 6. 
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adopting this male standard, and is maintained and upheld via the medi-
um of “liberal legalism” which simultaneously “enforces that view on 
society.”141  Both society and the judiciary have failed to recognize the 
true disposition of gender classifications, and courts have remained rela-
tively “backward and entrenched.”142  According to MacKinnon, the lib-
eral view underlying this “neutrality” approach is that abstract categories 
such as equality or speech define systems, and when you strengthen 
equality or speech in one place in society, you strengthen it everywhere.  
The problem with this neutrality approach is that it fails to recognize that 
substantive systems like male supremacy are just as much systems as ab-
stract systems.143 
Sex discrimination law is not “real” and does not “work”; it is men 
who think it does.144  MacKinnon would attest that this is partly because 
most of the cases shaping sex discrimination doctrine that have reached 
the U.S. Supreme Court since 1971 have been brought (and won) by 
white men “seeking access to the few benefits women had.”145  For ex-
ample, when it comes to pornography, it is only when male children 
came before the Supreme Court that it “understood that before the por-
nography became the pornographer’s speech, it was somebody’s life.”146  
Only then was child pornography illegalized. 
MacKinnon has repeatedly attacked courts for not giving women in 
pornography the same legal protection children have been given.  Courts 
have held that the harm pornography does is not as important as the free 
speech associated with the materials.147  She attacks female judges for 
upholding pornography, yet apparently waters down that attack by 
claiming that women who achieve male forms of power will behave like 
men, and that women in power are usually accountable to men.148  She 
                                                          
 141. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 237. 
 142. HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 129. 
 143. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 164-65. 
 144. See PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 138, at 10-11. 
 145. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 227.  See also, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 
130, at 64 (if no white male is present it is just a fact if you are poorly paid or educated—not dis-
crimination). 
 146. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 179 (discussing New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747 (1982)). 
 147. See, e.g., id.  “I take it seriously when Justice Douglas speaking on pornography and oth-
ers preaching absolutism say that pornography has to be protected speech or else free expression 
will not mean what it has always meant in this country.”  Id. at 209.  attacking Judge Easterbrook in 
the 7th Circuit for holding pornography is free speech.  Id. at 210. 
 148. Id. at 219-20.  MacKinnon has elsewhere watered-down (insulted?) conservative women’s 
responsibility for their actions or thoughts, “ . . . ERA [Equal Rights Amendment] activists blamed 
conservative women for failing to support their version of sex equality more than they blamed what 
such women were up against for undermining the ERA’s appeal to them. . . . dispossessed can be 
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has attacked courts for telling us that materials that contain defamatory 
ideas are protected speech, even though those materials “discriminate 
against women from objectification to murder.”149  She has gone so far 
as to assert, “Sometimes I think that what is ultimately found obscene is 
what does not turn on the Supreme Court . . . .”150 
MacKinnon argues that the “differences” approach to sex discrimi-
nation, which courts usually take, does not work.  The problem is that 
the standard for determining discrimination is male.  The quintessal ex-
ample is pregnancy; because men cannot get pregnant (cannot be simi-
larly situated) it is not discrimination to treat women differently.  This 
approach ignores that the male is still the standard against which the 
woman is judged; the differences are then allowed to be “relevant,” and 
courts can easily get around equality by rationalizing the social subordi-
nation of women.151  The measuring stick for equality as male is neutral 
in its mainstream interpretation: “it gives little to women that it cannot 
also give to men, maintaining sex inequality while appearing to address 
it.”152  The reality is that sex discrimination law prohibits almost nothing 
that socially disadvantages only women.153  The liberal neutrality ap-
proach is a mirage. 
MacKinnon has denounced liberalism as elitist and anti-feminist.154  
She has maintained that liberalism accomplishes little in the way of sex 
equality because liberalism’s methodological and “magical” approach is 
to create laws and then pretend they are reality.  Her perception of liber-
alism is that it assumes equality exists already when it does not, making 
it “almost impossible to produce equality by law.”155  This, MacKinnon 
                                                          
maneuvered into doing themselves in, a feature proponents and opponents of ERA share.”  Cath-
arine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 763 (1987). 
 149. ONLY WORDS, supra note 132, at 38. 
 150. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 153.  She has also attacked the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota for holding pornography as an “idea” and hence speech while simultaneously 
observing that “even the most liberal construction would be strained  to find an ‘idea’ in it.”  ONLY 
WORDS, supra note 132, at 14 (citation omitted).  She has frequently attacked the Hudnut Court for 
upholding pornography as free speech, saying that its effects depend upon “mental intermediation”.  
See, e.g., ONLY WORDS, supra note 132, at 18 (citing American Booksellers Ass’n Inc. v. Hudnut, 
771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
 151. HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 119, 121. She attacks the Gilbert court for holding that a 
company is not prevented on sex discrimination grounds from not covering pregnancy and other 
female-related ailments on its insurance policy while that policy did cover certain ailments which 
only affect men.  Id. at 187-88. 
 152. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 168. 
 153. Id. at 222. 
 154. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 205. 
 155. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 231. 
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asserts, is nothing but an illusion.156  “Both the liberal and the left view 
rationalize male power by presuming that it does not exist, that equality 
between the sexes . . . is society’s basic norm. . . .”157  The solution of-
fered by liberalism has been tolerance, which MacKinnon finds just an-
other means by which those in power keep what they want.158  Liberal 
equality offers women whatever men have always had, and what men 
have always had is access to women.  Therefore, abstract equality un-
dermines and reinforces substantive inequality.159  “[S]ex equality is 
conceptually designed in law never to be achieved.”160 
When it comes to rape and women’s sexuality, “[t]o be property 
would be an improvement” for women.161  The crime of rape is defined 
from the male point of view, and men are systematically conditioned to 
not recognize what women want.162  The social standard is stacked 
against women because if women cannot prove rape in court, they were 
not raped.  The state may perpetuate rape victims’ experiences by forc-
ing them to relive the rape again in court.163  MacKinnon has implied 
that rape laws do not work, because it generally takes three women testi-
fying to the same or similar treatment to overcome one man saying that a 
woman consented.164 
Similarly, with respect to pornography, women’s only protection is 
obscenity laws, and the obscenity standard is built on what is seen from 
the male standpoint.165  “[T]he fight over a definition of obscenity is a 
fight among men over the best means to guarantee male power as a sys-
tem.”166  Obscenity law is only words;167 it actually helps perpetuate 
                                                          
 156. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 219.  “The procedure is: imagine the fu-
ture you want, construct actions or legal rules or social practices as if we were already there, and 
that will get us from here to there.  This magical approach to social change, which is methodologi-
cally liberal, lives entirely in the head, a head that is more determined by present reality than it is 
taking seriously, yet it is not sufficiently grounded in that reality to do anything about it.”  Id. 
 157. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 249. 
 158. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 15. 
 159. Id. at 14. 
 160. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 233. 
 161. Id. at 172.  See also id. at 242 (“Sex equality in law has not been meaningfully defined for 
women, but has been defined and limited from the male point of view to correspond with the exist-
ing social reality of sex inequality.”). 
 162. Id. at 180-81. See also, HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 163 (“[M]en are responsible 
only if they know they are sexually offensive, and nothing in the law requires (or even strongly en-
courages) them to know what their conduct means to women.”). 
 163. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 179-80.  MacKinnon also notes that women do not report 
rapes (or sexual harassment) because they are not legal injuries, or women are not in a social posi-
tion to complain.  HARASSMENT, supra note 30 at 160. 
 164. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 293-94, n.107. 
 165. Id. at 148. 
 166. Id. at 153. 
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pornography because  “[o]bscenity is the legal device through which it is 
legally repudiated but legally permitted.”168  What is obscene is set by 
social standards, and what is standard is set by pornography. 
The legality of abortion is another example MacKinnon has given 
of a law written by and for men; the availability of abortion  “enhances 
the availability of intercourse.”169  According to MacKinnon, laws con-
cerning sexual assault and harassment are consistent with a dominant 
male’s sexual pleasure.170  The privacy doctrine used to uphold the abor-
tion right is perfect for the liberal state, MacKinnon informs us, because 
the right to privacy is actually about men’s right “to be let alone” and to 
oppress women individually.171  MacKinnon has also attacked the right 
to privacy doctrine as allowing wife-beating,172 prostitution and sexual 
abuse, because one meaning of privacy is, effectively, “the right to dom-
inate free of public scrutiny.”173  When abuse is done to women in pri-
vate it is termed consensual and thus acceptable, and when it is done 
through pornography it is termed speech and thus constitutional.174 
Women can fight, and have fought, male supremacy, but have nev-
er been able to conquer it.175  MacKinnon has illustrated these opinions 
with analogies to chickens and rats.  In some old behavioral experi-
ments, chickens were divided into three groups: the first got fed every 
time they pecked; the second, every other time; the third, at random.  
                                                          
 167. ONLY WORDS, supra note 132, at 88-89.  “Equally difficult in practice has been the 
requirement in the obscenity test that community standards be proven violated.  The more pornog-
raphy there is, the more it sets de facto community standards, conforming views of what is accepta-
ble to what is arousing. . . .  In other words, inequality is allowed to set community standards for the 
treatment of women. . . .  This irrelevant and unworkable tool is then placed in the hands of the 
state, most of whose actors have little interest in stopping [the abuse to women in pornography] but 
a substantial interest in avoiding prosecutions they cannot win.  The American law of obscenity, as 
a result, is only words.”  Id. 
 168. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 201. 
 169. Id. at 188 (“In this context it becomes clear why the struggle for reproductive freedom has 
never included a woman’s right to refuse sex.”). 
 170. Reflections, supra note 132, at 1300-01. 
 171. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 190, 194 (citations omitted). 
 172. HARRASSMENT, supra note 130, at 160, “Women’s attempts to gain legal redress and pro-
tection from domestic victimization are infamously ineffectual.  This suggests that intimate assaults 
on women by men are ignored even when they are reported. . . .”  Id. 
 173. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 14 
(1993).  “The private is then defined as a place of freedom by effectively rendering consensual what 
women and children are forced to do out of the public eye. Prostitution is thus often referred to as 
occurring in private between consenting adults, as is marriage and family. The result is to extend the 
aura of privacy and protection from public intervention from sex to sexual abuse.”  Id. at 14-15. 
 174. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 15. 
 175. TOWARD, supra note 130, at 138 (“Women often find ways to resist male supremacy 
and to expand their spheres of action.  But they are never free of it.”). 
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The first group stopped trying to peck immediately when the food was 
cut off; the second stopped soon after; but the third never stopped trying.  
In a different experiment, rats received shocks every time they tried to 
leave their cage.  Women, MacKinnon analogizes, are rewarded like the 
third group of chickens and punished like the rats: “[W]e peck forever 
for the occasional crumb that seems to reward our efforts and reinforces 
our hopes out of all proportion to reality, and we spend the rest of our 
time skulking in the corners of the cages we no longer try to leave.”176 
Those performing the experiments, so to speak, come from both the 
left and the right.  For example, MacKinnon has noted that the posture 
that women’s abuse in pornography is the “thought” or “emotion” of the 
pornographer (the pornographer’s constitutionally protected speech) 
unites “libertarian economist and judge Frank Easterbrook,” “liberal phi-
losopher-king Ronald Dworkin,” “conservative scholar and judge Rich-
ard Posner,” and “pornographers’ lawyer Edward DeGrazia.”177  Ac-
cording to MacKinnon, when it comes to pornography, at least, the left 
and the right are two roads to the same goal: male dominance.  Judges in 
the U.S., on the left and the right, “together with politicians, journalists, 
and pornographers” also have a single goal: making injury through por-
nography actionable as sex discrimination a violation of the First 
Amendment.178  The strategies: the conservatives cover up pornography 
with obscenity law, while the liberals parade it as tolerance and free 
speech.179 
It is not only men on the left and the right in the U.S. which have 
come together in the male dominance goal—it is men globally.  Under 
international human rights laws, systemic and systematic violations to 
women do not apply.180  MacKinnon has told how U.N. and Serbian sol-
diers together raped Muslim and Croatian women,181 how men interna-
tionally condone violent behavior towards women in war, and how alt-
hough these acts flagrantly violate women’s rights, far too often, nothing 
is done.182  Raped women are told to go to the state for help, but men run 
                                                          
 176. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 226-27. 
 177. ONLY WORDS, supra note 132, at 10. 
 178. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography Left and Right, 30 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 143, 
147-48 (1995). 
 179. Id. at 161.  MacKinnon also attacks the liberals for attacking the conservatives’ obscenity 
law and then siding with them when pornography comes along.  Id.  at 145-46. 
 180. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 59, 
60-61 (1993) [hereinafter “Crimes”]. 
 181. Id. at 67-68. 
 182. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights, 17 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J 5, 6-7 (1994). 
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the states, make the laws, and enforce them at will.  State sovereign im-
munity protects each state’s lack of protection for women.  MacKinnon 
sees this as what looks like a global fraternity pact: “When men sit in 
rooms being states, they are largely being men.  They protect each other; 
they identify with each other; they try not to limit each other in ways 
they themselves do not want to be limited.”183  The inference is she 
questions if there is hope for the system because the guardian/protectors 
(the U.N. soldiers) are in cahoots with the Serbs and their rape/death 
camps.184 
However, MacKinnon does not appear too shocked by this interna-
tional conspiracy, so to speak.  She sees male dominance as a trend that 
began at least with Aristotle’s “likes and unlikes” philosophy,185 contin-
uing through the Enlightenment, the Nazi Regime, mainstream U.S. 
equality jurisprudence, and then on to international human rights.186  She 
has elsewhere stated that most sexism is “unconscious” or “well-meant;” 
that men are “systematically conditioned” not to recognize women’s 
wants or feelings.187  So, although men see women as second-class citi-
zens,188 MacKinnon has almost given an apology for this treatment.  One 
may infer that a fundamental reason why she questions whether there is 
hope for “the system” is that the sexism is not only so pervasive, but so 
unconscious.189 
From this discussion of the pervasiveness, unconsciousness, and 
universality of sexism, it is not difficult to trust in MacKinnon’s veracity 
when she solidly maintains that the Constitution was not originally, and 
still is not, founded upon equality.190  That is, because the sociological 
and psychological191 roots of sexism run so deep, discernible at least 
                                                          
 183. Id. at 15. 
 184. Crimes, supra note 180, at 67-68 (women have no rights in the war context). 
 185. Aristotle maintained that things which are like should be treated alike and things which 
are unlike should be treated unalike.  MacKinnon has written, “That women were apparently so dif-
ferent to Aristotle as not to be treated unequally under his principle when excluded from citizenship 
has not been regarded as a drawback or an indication that something is amiss.”  Id at 72. 
 186. Id. at 81. 
 187. TOWARDS, supra note 130, at 230; 181 (“systematically conditioned”, discussing rape). 
 188. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 118-19. 
 189. See generally id.  The pervasiveness may also be illustrated by what MacKinnon calls the 
“institution” of heterosexuality, which is suggested as functioning as yet another form of the wide-
spread oppression of women.  Id. at 60-61.  Further, even men who are homosexually assaulted are 
actually assaulted as women, because they are feminized and “stripped of their social status of 
men.”  Oncale v. Sundower Offshoreservices, Inc., 96-568, Amici Curiae Brief Insupport of Peti-
tioner, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 9, 15, 19 (1997).  This, according to MacKinnon is another act re-
flecting a male dominant heterosexual culture.  8 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. at 19. 
 190. Supra note 132. 
 191. MacKinnon is also vehemently against Freudianism.  See, e.g., FEMINISM 
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since the days of Aristotle, it is only natural that the U.S. Constitution’s 
“We the People” actually included only certain, privileged white males. 
MacKinnon seems conflicted on the Constitution.  She is not both-
ered by the notion of constitutional evil as Balkin is, because the Consti-
tution as interpreted does not deserve fidelity.  She has gone one step 
further than Balkin and disassociated herself with the Constitution, at 
least as it is presently interpreted.192  She has also rejected Ronald 
Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the Constitution as elitist and exclusion-
ary.  She claims her own “aggressive” reading of the Constitution is not 
founded upon her own pontification of what she feels is right or wrong 
and thus should be law.  She has explicitly denied that her project is to 
engage in “theorizing morally” when answering the question of how the 
Constitution can be made legitimate.193 
Her basic strategy, on the surface, is to presume that the Constitu-
tion provides for equality, and must now only be made to live up to it.  
Yet her argument is flawed and circular from the beginning.  She con-
cedes that the Constitution may be forced to live up to its “equality 
promise” for the first time in history, and that holding the Constitution to 
its “equality promise” does not stem from belief in the Constitution itself 
but belief in people’s equality.  She announces that we should not allow 
the Constitution to make people less than equal.194  But the Constitution 
prohibits the unequal.195  Does the Equal Protection Clause contain her 
equality principle or not?  If not, she says it should. 
This reasoning is perplexing.  It is contradictory.  If the Constitu-
tion prohibits inequality, how does it simultaneously make people less 
than equal?  Bad interpretations?  If holding the Constitution to its equal-
ity promise does not stem from the Constitution itself where does it 
come from?  From experiences of people, e.g., women?  Does the Con-
stitution hold such a promise, or not?  She claims that “if” the Constitu-
                                                          
UNMODIFIED, supra note 130, at 51, 205. 
 192. Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Freedom from Unreal Loyalties”: On Fidelity in Constitu-
tional Interpretation“”, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1773, 1773-74  (1997) [hereinafter “Loyalties”].  See 
also Balkin section, supra , for discussion of constitutional evil. 
 193.  Loyalties, supra note 192, at 1773. 
 194. See id. at 1775.  “Do you give up on the Constitution. . . . [o]r do you decide to hold the 
Constitution up to its promise, for the first time if necessary?  If you take this ‘bottom up’ approach, 
it is not because you believe in the Constitution, although you might, but because you believe in the 
equality of your people, and you are not going to let the Constitution make them less.”  Id. 
 195. Id. at 1776-77.  Presumably this is a reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, which she 
mentions specifically.  Id. at 1776.  She argues that whether one group is treated equally is an equal 
protection concern, at least when interpreted from the point of view of women and others treated 
unequally.  Id.  Whether this treatment is morally wrong is another question.  Id. 
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tion had no equality promise, she would “be trying to get one in.”196  It 
sure sounds like this is what she is doing already, despite her claims 
against “theorizing morally,” against moral readings of the Constitution.  
Her insistence upon her equality principle is a moral judgment. 
2.  And What She Says Now 
In every sense, MacKinnon’s concurring Panel opinion does not 
elucidate the above Constitutional contradictions, but confounds them.  
Early in her opinion she cites to the “equality rule,” which is presumably 
synonymous with her previously discussed “equality promise”— the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “purpose and promise” of equality.197  Yet, in 
her familiar manner of discorded logic, she also announces that Consti-
tutional equality guarantee has no definition.198  Yet, she concedes that 
segregation on the basis of race was seen as Constitutionally equal, and 
that Plessy and its progeny were wrong.  Is she not then saying that 
equality indeed does have a definition after all, but that it is wrong?  
Perhaps she means to say: “we need to redefine this definition”— not 
define it? 
To support her concurrence that Plessy was wrong, she cites to the 
lower courts’ findings regarding the infamous psychology study that 
found that segregation does harm to black children.  She makes much of 
the point of damages—that the black children are objectively and not 
simply subjectively harmed by the segregation officially imposed upon 
them.199  She demands that we assume that blacks and whites’ intellectu-
al capacity is the same.200  She holds white supremacy responsible for 
the creation and perpetuation of caste.  She finds this castism “inimical 
to an equality rule.”  There it is again, the infamous equality rule. 
She cites Shelley v. Kramer as supporting the idea that the Four-
teenth Amendment was passed to “dismantle precisely the substantive 
reality of imposed systematic inferiority of black to white.”  She quotes 
Justice Harlan’s dissent from Plessy, which stated that the statute then in 
question was really about keeping blacks away from whites; it had noth-
                                                          
 196. Id. at 1779. 
 197. See Professor MacKinnon, Address at the 2000 Annual Constitutional Meeting (Jan. 5-9, 
2000) in AALS 2000 Constitutional Annual Meeting: What Brown Should Have Said, Tape 196 
(Recorded Resources Corp.). 
 198. She says, “This case requires us to define no less than what equality as guaranteed by the 
Constitution means.”  See id. 
 199. This was the Plessy Courts’ reasoning.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 200. This assumption has been rejected by some.  See generally CHARLES MURRAY AND 
RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN 
LIFE (1994). 
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ing to do with equality.201  As done in her previous writings, she attacks 
segregation and the similarly situated rule as nothing but the inequality 
we have inherited from Aristotle and his likes/dislikes philosophy.  She 
proceeds to make the analogy with the Nuremburg laws of the Third 
Reich.  This spattering of selected precedent, for what it may be worth in 
supporting her concurrence, is difficult to square with her claim that the 
Framers’ purpose is “clear:” “to promote equality.”  (Again, presumably 
she is referring to the Fourteenth Amendment Framers, not the original 
Framers.)  How can one tell, no less determine that, from a “Constitution 
that reflects an unequal society” a “clear” equality purpose is to be 
found?  How can a society historically hierarchically stratified—and 
let’s remember her talk of pervasive unconscious sexism—reflect a 
“clear” purpose of an equality promise, unless one is willing to admit 
that equality simply meant something different to the Framers (any set of 
them) than it does to some today? 
In the end, the equality promise is not so “clear.”  MacKinnon ad-
mits that it stems from a “contextualized historical determination.” She 
admits that resistance to change makes change slow.  One can only con-
clude from this statement that the “equality promise” she would like to 
read in the Constitution, Plessy’s dissent, Shelley, or elsewhere, is not 
the same as what the Framers and society have historically understood 
equality to mean.  If it were the same equality, it would not need to be 
changed.  In sum, MacKinnon’s panel opinion starts with the nebulous 
“equality promise,” and is supported by a few selective pieces of prece-
dent.  She makes the bold assertion that the Framers’ purpose is clearly 
to promote this equality, but consistently diffuses her own argument.  
The consistency lies in the discorded logic which is found from her pre-
vious writings and continues into her panel opinion.202 
                                                          
 201. Regarding Plessy, she also says, “The upshot of Plessy’s reasonable test is to promote 
what might be called rational discrimination, that basically when enough social equality has been 
achieved over inequalities that have been systematically imposed, official segregation will no longer 
be reasonable.”  The meaning of this is very unclear.  See MacKinnon, supra note 197. 
 202. It may also be noted that her sentences and thoughts are often hard to follow and decipher.  
This is similar to confusion that can be found in her writings.  For example, in HARASSMENT, supra 
note 130, at 110 she wrote the following confusing paragraph: “What changed between Plessy and 
Brown was the implicit standard for what would be seen to be a reasonable difference in the social 
position of the races.  In the Plessy perspective, the poignant evidence of the damage segregation 
does to children which supported the Brown result could have supported the opposite legal result—
that blacks were different, thus deserving of different, that is, separate, educational treatment.  In 
Brown, only racial differences which were not based on racial inequality were ‘reasonable’—hence, 
there were no reasonable racial differences.”  HARASSMENT, supra note 130, at 110 (citations omit-
ted).  It is also interesting to note that she has written, “We purport to want to change things, but we 
talk in ways that no one understands. . . . [discusses that most women are illiterate]. . . .  I’m not 
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C.  Professor Michael McConnell 
In a nutshell, our reading of McConnell is as follows.  His basic po-
sition is one of originalism, paralleling the Nicaean dispute over text and 
inclusion of facts outside the text.  McConnell rightly criticizes Acker-
man and company for what he (McConnell) called bait-and-switch.  Bait 
and switch for McConnell is doctrinal manipulation to achieve ad hoc 
policy, expediency, or political results which are therefore low on the 
scale of principled decisions.  But McConnell himself is perhaps guilty 
of a shell game himself.  In his originalist zeal, he manipulates the canon 
to include Congressional votes on desegregation type legislation.  
McConnell also posits an implicit Congressional divesting of Supreme 
Court jurisdiction on the basis of the clause empowering Congress to 
implement the Fourteenth Amendment.  He manipulates Congressional 
silence in the District of Columbia to obtain a result which he argues 
precludes segregation there.  Based upon an unarticulated reliance on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, finally McConnell contradicts himself by using 
the forum of the forbidden Supreme Court for his Panel opinion, which 
argues that  only Congress and not the Court has jurisdiction. 
1.  What He Wrote Before 
Professor Balkin’s invitation to Professor Michael McConnell was 
understandable, because it served ecumenical objectives.  McConnell 
has written several articles justifying Brown’s desegregation holding on 
conservative originalist grounds.203 More credibility for the result in 
Brown could be obtained because McConnell has vehemently attacked 
the left-liberal, postmodernist jurisprudential world in which Balkin and 
many of the other panelists have been known to reside.204 Balkin granted 
                                                          
exempting myself from this criticism, I’m saying that I see it as fundamental to developing a politics 
of language that will be  constructive as well as deconstructive.”  FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra 
note 130, at 47.  (One author of this article is not an illiterate female, and she does not understand 
what that means.) 
 203.  See generally Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) 
[hereinafter “Originalism”]; The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 457 (1996) [hereinafter “Originalist Case”] ; Segregation and the Original Under-
standing: A Reply to Professor Maltz, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 233 (1996) [hereinafter “Maltz”]; The 
Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995) 
[hereinafter “Klarman”]. 
 204. See, e.g., The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment to Ronald 
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997) [hereinafter 
“Dworkin”]; The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV. 453  (2000) [hereinafter “Es-
tablishmentarianism”]; Brennan’s Approach to Reading and Interpreting the Constitution, 43 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 41 (1999) [hereinafter “Brennan”]; Michael J. Perry, The Role of Democratic 
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this ideological opponent the honor of speaking second at the Panel, fol-
lowing only Balkin himself.  For, it could be impressive that even the 
conservative McConnell concurs in the panel opinion favoring Brown 
desegregation, for reasons with which even the most traditional listener 
might have to agree.  The trouble is that McConnell who had criticized 
others for “bait and switch,” played quite a few shell games to obtain the 
traditionalist rules he offered as standards. 
The bulk of McConnell’s writings have centered on a call for sepa-
ration of powers, particularly judicial restraint, based on traditional (con-
servative) notions of the federalist and democratic governmental struc-
ture set forth by the Constitution’s founders.  McConnell applauds 
Justice Scalia’s “originalism, traditionalism, and restraint” approach to 
judicial review, because all three methods reflect the will of the People, 
“We the People,” if you will, not the will of the Supreme Court.205  Pre-
dictably Justice Brennan draws McConnell’s fire for his lack of positiv-
ism: “[Casting away all traditional constraints on decision-making plac-
es] into the hands of judges the power to turn their own views of good 
social policy into law without any credible basis in constitutional text, 
history, precedent, constitutional tradition, or contemporary democratic 
warrant.”206  In short, however, on the face of it, Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation-type decisions would seemingly qualify with the other cases con-
demned by McConnell as examples in which the role of the judiciary has 
been unconstitutionally wrent asunder. Why not? 
Reciting the usual originalist litany, McConnell traces the judici-
ary’s proper function back to the Framers of the Constitution and their 
original intent.  McConnell tells us that the early Americans’ under-
standing of fundamental rights was directly influenced by England’s 
Coke and Hale, who both disagreed with Hobbes’ view that law is noth-
                                                          
Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501 (1989) (book review) 
[hereinafter “Perry”]; On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359 (1988) [hereinafter 
“Reading”]; “God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!”: Freedom of Religion in the Post-modern 
Age, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REV. 163 (1993) [hereinafter “God is Dead”]. 
 205.  Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136-37 
(1998) [hereinafter “Dead Hand”].  McConnell notes that he, and not Scalia, makes the connection 
that these three approaches all reflect the will of the People.  Id. at 1133.  McConnell further notes 
that Scalia does not specify when it is appropriate to use which approach.  Id.  “Traditionalism” as a 
methodology is a term McConnell apparently claims to have coined: “[T]he Constitution should be 
interpreted in accordance with the long-standing and evolving practices, experiences, and tradition 
of the nation.  I refer to this Constitutional methodology as ‘traditionalism’”.  Id. 
 206.  Brennan, supra note 204, at 58.  McConnell adds that he was a clerk for Justice Brennan, 
and that he is not being disloyal or unappreciative; McConnell notes that he and Brennan often used 
to disagree, and Brennan appreciated their discourse.  Id. at 57, 58. 
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ing more than the sovereign’s command.207  To the founders, therefore, 
the essence of constitutionalism was protection of rights, which were al-
ready long established, in the common law legal tradition, not rights at-
tributable to legislative or furnished by parliamentary supremacy.208  
Thus, the government created by the Constitution was designed to pre-
serve preexisting rights, not to create new rights.209  The role of the judi-
ciary then is to protect rights, which the people have established for 
themselves over time.  Neglect of the authority of tradition, McConnell 
tells us, “has produced a constitutional theory that is untrue to our con-
stitutional heritage and unable to understand our constitutional prac-
tice.”210  The court’s place was not originally, as it is not now, to judi-
cially legislate. 
Repeatedly, McConnell has also alerted his readers that there is 
nothing special about judges that places them in an advantaged position 
to prophesize.211  McConnell has attacked the doctrine of unenumerated 
rights, promulgated under the rubric of substantive due process, as 
open-ended judicial review which threatens to undermine and cut short 
the democratic process of “open-minded and public-spirited delibera-
tion,”212 presumably a reference to what occurs in the legislative branch. 
Further, McConnell has informed his readers that Roe v. Wade’s 
substantive due process methodology has indeed (finally) been ended: 
Washington v. Glucksberg213 held that federal courts have no authority 
“to resolve contentious questions of social policy on the basis of their 
own normative judgment.”214  The Washington court declared that un-
enumerated due process rights must be based on the Constitutional text, 
                                                          
 207. See Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 183-89 (1998).  Coke, trying to remain within his religious tradition, ar-
gued that law came from the changeless “mists of time”.  Id. at 184.  His successor, Hale, argued 
that law evolved from the changing and adopting of customs and traditions of the people.  Id. at 188. 
 208.  Id. at 190.  The early Americans were not represented by Parliament, but by colonial as-
semblies, so they argued they were exempt from Parliamentary Supremacy.  Id. at 190. 
 209.  Id. at 196 
 210.  Id. at 174-75 
 211.  See, e.g., Perry, supra note 204, at 1534, “there is nothing unique about judges them-
selves that places them ‘in an institutionally advantaged position to play a prophetic role’.” (citation 
omitted). 
 212.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89,108 (1988) [hereinafter “Moral Realist”].  The most commonly cited neg-
ative example of this doctrine is the Lochner period cases. 
 213.   521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that terminally ill adults do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest under the due process clause to have their physicians aid them in dying). 
 214.  Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH 
L. REV. 665, 666  (1997). 
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in conjunction with the nation’s tradition and experience.215  According 
to McConnell, Washington’s significance rests predominantly in its res-
toration of the proper balance of power between courts and the legisla-
ture under the Fourteenth Amendment.216 
McConnell elsewhere infers that rebalancing was much needed, be-
cause “[t]he appearance of debate and deliberation created by the [court] 
opinions is largely a sham.”217  The judiciary’s analysis, McConnell en-
lightens us, particularly that of the Supreme Court, is “typically long on 
manipulation of precedent and low on intelligible principle.”218  “All the 
apparatus of Supreme Court opinions is designed to create the appear-
ance that the Justices are following the law, not making it up.”219  It is 
only in Constitutional law, McConnell observes, that people want to 
“give up on the enterprise as impossible” if the Constitution is un-
clear.220  In other words, by giving up on the enterprise, McConnell 
means moving from some form of originalism to a policy or a political 
morality interpretive stance (e.g. Dworkin).  McConnell analogizes: No 
one would be willing to say that judges can write contracts out of the law 
just because they are unclearly written.  They can write clauses based on 
the parties’ probable intent.  Since judges cannot write new terms into 
contracts without probable intent, why, McConnell asks, is judicial re-
writing often readily accepted when it comes to the Constitution?221  
Here McConnell suggests that jurists take the stance to produce a partic-
ular outcome.222 
The particular outcome that troubles McConnell may be more 
clearly understood by what McConnell calls establishmentarianism.  Es-
tablishmentarianism is what liberalism strives to break away from.  It is 
                                                          
 215.  See id. 
 216.  See id at 665-66, 708 (probably the most important case in last twenty years on unenu-
merated rights).  McConnell infers that the magnitude of the Washington decision  is as earthshak-
ing as Lochner, Brown, and Roe were.  See id. 
 217.  Perry, supra note 204, at 1537. 
 218.  See id.  (referring to the Court’s decisions in “affirmative action, parochial school aid, 
children’s rights, educational funding, capital punishment, pornography, property rights, and oth-
ers.”). 
 219.  Dead Hand, supra note 205, at 1129. 
 220.  Reading, supra note 204, at 361. 
 221.  See id. But McConnell’s premise is wrong. Judges rewrite contracts all the time for poli-
cy reasons, implying this provision and that, not to mention use of the objective theory of contracts 
to do what they want. 
 222.  McConnell has not inferred that it is only liberal judges who seek substantive outcomes 
regardless of constitutional precedent: “For most people most of the time, issues of federalism take 
second seat to particular substantive outcomes” (quote made with reference to Rehnquist’s uphold-
ing of the drinking age of 21).  See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ 
Design’ 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1488 (1987) (book review) [hereinafter Evaluating]. 
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“[t]he idea that a nation should be animated by a set of common values 
and beliefs, backed by governmental authority.”223  Liberalism, on the 
other hand, champions varied and individual political, religious, and 
moral associations.  In liberal states, such as the United States, it is theo-
retically difficult or impossible for the state to engage in the promotion 
of public virtues without compromising its commitment to neutrality.  
The private sector, therefore, is the principle inculcator of individual as 
well as public values.224 
Theoretically.  McConnell has thus offered a theory that our liberal 
state is not so liberal after all because it offers a set of “politically correct 
values.”  He argues that establishmentarianism has insinuated its way in-
to our society, and has recently surfaced with a “new” set of values.  Es-
tablishmentarianism makes its way into a liberal society not on the an-
cient traditional ground that it is for the spiritual good of the people, but 
on the political ground that “certain common values are necessary to the 
unity and republican character of the state.”225 
This search for common values, McConnell posits, is likely only an 
“excuse for imposition of majoritarian norms.”  The initial era of estab-
lishmentarianism reared its head during the height of immigration, when  
“nativists, anti-Catholics, and common school reformers” united in the 
formation of public schools, which were designed to inculcate 
“Protestant, capitalist, and patriotic virtue.”226  Recently, the new estab-
lishmentarianism, McConnell explains, has manifested under the guise 
of “pluralism, diversity, and tolerance.”  This time, however, the ex-
tolled public virtues are not Protestantism, capitalism, and patriotism, 
but rather the “eradication of racism, sexism, and heterosexism,”227 and 
the encouragement of environmentalism, safe sex, and a critical attitude 
towards global Westernization.228 But McConnell advises us that we are 
being misled, because the new establishmentarianism is no less hostile 
towards pluralism, diversity, and tolerance than the prior era was,229 in 
                                                          
 223.  Establishmentarianism, supra note 204, at 453.  McConnell notes that establishmentari-
anism comes in both religious and secular varieties; it is but need not be associated with persecu-
tion,  for sanctions can range from highly coercive to tolerant, for not adhering to the views backed 
by the polis.  Id. at 453-54. 
 224.  See id. at 455. 
 225.  Id. at 458 (Reference to Benjamin Rush’s reasoning for public schools and their curricu-
lums.) 
 226.  Id. at 458-59 (containing the above quotes). 
 227.  Id. at 461-62 (supporting this and previous quote). 
 228.  God is Dead, supra note 204, at 179 (explaining that education today is used to promul-
gate a new set of values). 
 229.  Establishmentarianism, supra note 204, at 461-62.  An example McConnell provides is 
the cases involving Chicago and Yale law schools, which would not allow the Christian Legal Soci-
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that it allows little tolerance for those who do not join the “politically 
correct.”  When citizens are coerced230 into displaying majoritarian be-
liefs, McConnell warns, liberalism is, for all intents and purposes, 
smothered. 
McConnell blames the postmodernists, attacking them as hypo-
crites.  McConnell reminds us that the postmodernists have taught that 
liberalism’s purported neutrality is really only a cover-up for centuries of 
“patriarchal, white, male, European, and bourgeois interests and values,” 
and that objectivity is therefore a mirage since our perception and the 
perception of those who established those values, were clouded by our 
individual perspectives.231  The postmodernists invariably select their 
favorite (political) topic; it may be racism, feminism, environmentalism, 
welfare, etc.  The postmodernists then call on their secular ideologies 
and “use political muscle to advance their causes, including using the 
public schools to inculcate their ideals.”232 
McConnell may be arguing, indirectly, that postmodernists back 
more expansive roles for the judiciary in constitutional cases, because 
that is one of the most efficient ways to advance their ideological goals.  
For example, McConnell attacks Ronald Dworkin for advocating that 
judges should read the Constitution based on their “own views about po-
litical morality” rather than “purporting” to decide cases based on “tradi-
tion” or “constitutional structure.”233  The idea of judges substituting 
their own conceptions of what is best for those of representative bodies 
is, McConnell has repeatedly informed us, the antithesis of what the 
founding statesmen understood constitutional rights to mean.234  In any 
event, McConnell finds that this violates the heart of a democratic socie-
ty.  “Judges act legitimately under the Constitution only when they are 
                                                          
ety to utilize the job placement offices because the Society only hires students who share in the 
groups’ religious beliefs.  Id. at 464-65.  Chicago and Yale banned the Society on grounds of dis-
crimination.  Id.  Though federal civil rights laws exempt religious organizations from religious an-
tidiscrimination laws, see Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 328 (1987), and Chicago and 
Yale as private organizations are not obliged to abide by the First Amendment, McConnell asks 
why these schools do not do so anyway.  Id. at 464-65 
 230.  The coercion often is “gentle”, such as through taxation and selective funding.  Id. at 468 
 231.  God is Dead, supra note 204, at 182.  See also Perry, supra note 202, at 1506.: “Perry’s 
insistence on self-critical rationality contradicts his own position that ‘[t]here is no evaluative per-
spective outside self or tradition’.”  Id. 
 232.  God is Dead, supra note 204 at 188. 
 233.  Dworkin, supra note 204, at 1272-73 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE 
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3-4 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)). Actually 
Dworkin denies that his judges should decide on the basis of their own political morality, and 
McConnell recognizes this.  Id. at 1272. 
 234.  See id.  at 1272-73, 1287. 
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faithfully enforcing [collective decisions of the people].  To enforce 
something else (on the claim that it would do more ‘credit to the nation’) 
separates the text from the source of its authority.”235  Thus, McConnell 
considers Dworkin and those in his camp to be laboring under false 
premises.  Dworkin and his acolytes maintain that judges decide “fairly 
and wisely,” when in actuality, “all judges fall short of the judicial ideal” 
due to bias, unintelligence, or the difficulty of transcending one’s own 
interests and values.236 
It is not clear to us why Brown would not fall into that category.  
McConnell attacks the Court’s ability to engage in meaningful moral de-
liberation because of class bias, and lack of time to read and deliber-
ate.237  He holds that “representative bodies are institutionally better able 
to reach solutions to contentious issues of this sort. . . .”238  So losers feel 
they have had their say; and an “unprincipled” compromise [quotes are 
McConnell’s] can be adopted.  When judges are unsure whether a gov-
ernmental action is unconstitutional, they should leave the determination 
to elected bodies, and not make their own opinions law.239 
He also attacks Professor Michael Perry’s approach.  McConnell 
further elaborates his views in his book review of Professor Michael Per-
ry’s book Morality, Politics and Law.  Professor McConnell, criticizing 
Perry’s approach, says: it is my experience and conviction that “the Con-
stitution is an elegant and profound statement of a highly attractive con-
ception of government.”240  He rejects the idea that the Constitution is “a 
mishmash of political compromises or a congeries of inscrutable 
phrases.”241 
McConnell does distance himself from a positivistic originalism, 
however.242  He criticizes Perry’s theory for being too open ended and 
doubts Perry’s claim that his theory has sufficiently circumscribed lim-
its.243  McConnell is disturbed that Perry seems to allow judges to pick 
and choose among Constitutional principles based on their own political-
moral preconceptions and reject those they do not like.244 
                                                          
 235.  Id. at 1278 n.45. 
 236.  Id. at 1291. 
 237. Perry, supra note 204, at 1537 (most judges reflect a bias in favor of upper middle class). 
 238. Id. at 1540. 
 239.  Reading, supra note 204, at 361. 
 240. Perry, supra note 204, at 1525. 
 241.  Id. at 1525.  This could be a slap at Professor Balkin. 
 242. Id.  (the discretion element remains). 
 243. Id. at 1526 (Perry’s approach is problematic). 
 244. Id. at 1529 (criticizing Perry for providing no examples of how his theory might work in 
practice). 
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It is not that the Constitution prevents social change; it only slows it 
down to ensure that change is made by the people.  “[T]he originalist 
method leaves ample scope for judgment and disagreement.”245  Even 
when attitudes are in the midst of change, courts should not “premature-
ly” resolve issues or “accelerate the pace of change.”  The several states 
are laboratories of democracy, and through experimentation, the people 
will find the appropriate solution to problems.246 McConnell is even 
willing to allow that sometimes community decisions will be wrong; that 
wrong is better than the “risk posed by alternatives”——namely, judicial 
legislation——which “are worse.”247 
It is interesting (and ironic) that with that background, McConnell 
has been able simultaneously to defend the Brown v. Board of Education 
decision on originalist grounds.  The majority scholarly opinion has been 
that the Ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to outlaw 
segregation, and hence, Brown did not follow the Ratifiers’ intent.248  
McConnell has maintained that the majority is wrong.  To elaborate this 
argument, McConnell argues that the Reconstruction Amendments were 
the “extension”249 or “culmination”250 of the “fundamental principles of 
the Founding” which “because of slavery, had never been fully 
achieved.”251  (May one then assume by analogy that the founders’ sex-
ism did not obstruct “culmination of fundamental principles of founding, 
leading to a society without gender bias?”) 
                                                          
 245.  Id. at 1533, 1535. 
 246.  Right to Die, supra note 214, at 687. 
 247.  Moral Realist, supra note 212, at 90.  “Perhaps most importantly, judges are irresponsible 
in the most fundamental sense: they are not accountable for the consequences of their decisions and 
ordinarily are not even aware of them.”  Id. at 106.  So is McConnell suggesting that Justice Bren-
nan, for whom McConnell clerked, did not, or was it could not understand the ramifications of his 
decisions. Is the same true of Justice Rehnquist?  “Power without responsibility is not a happy com-
bination.”  Id. 
 248.  The majority of scholars believe that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment didn’t 
intend to outlaw segregation because “[t]he evidence is ‘obvious’ and ‘[un]ambiguous’, the conclu-
sion is ‘inevitable’ and ‘inescapable’ and ‘[v]irtually nothing’ supports the opposite claim, which is 
said to be ‘fanciful’.  Originalism, supra note 203, at 951.  Of course, the majority of scholars do 
not ultimately hold that against the validity of the holding.  McConnell’s central article on this sub-
ject, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, “relied heavily” on prior work done by Maltz.  
Maltz disagrees with McConnell and contends that the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid seg-
regation on its face, and does not, by its original understanding, support Brown’s holding.  Maltz, 
supra note 203, at 233. 
 249.  Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 
115, 142 n.93 (1994) [hereinafter “Moment”]. 
 250.  Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution or 
the Logical Culmination of the Tradition?, 25 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (1992) [hereinafter 
“The Fourteenth Amendment”]. 
 251.  Moment, supra note 249, at 142 n.93. 
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McConnell supports his argument with proof founded on legislative 
activity during the Reconstruction period.  He concedes that the legisla-
tive history surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
unhelpful as to whether it intended to maintain or abrogate segrega-
tion.252  Despite his concession that the “principle purpose” of the Four-
teenth Amendment was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
and that the 1866 Act was not understood to forbid school segregation, 
McConnell nonetheless maintains that the Fourteenth Amendment, being 
“more” than the 1866 Act, does not necessarily have the same intention 
regarding segregation.253  Although he further admits that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not about granting blacks social equality, McConnell 
avers that the legislative history from 1868-1875, the “best available ev-
idence,” points to the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment did in-
tend to eradicate school segregation.254 
First, McConnell points to proposed House and Senate bills during 
the early 1870’s which by majority votes (over 50%) would have out-
lawed segregation in schools, common carriers and other institutions, but 
were unable to meet the required two-thirds override due in part to dem-
ocratic filibusters.  The “Sumner-Butler bill” on desegregation was ulti-
mately passed in 1874, after it had been watered-down and the school 
desegregation part had been removed.  The watered-down provisions be-
came the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  McConnell concludes that because 
those legislators who voted on the desegregation bills were the same as 
those who supported the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, and be-
cause those votes constituted a majority of the total votes, the main-
stream view during Reconstruction was that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires desegregation.255 
Second, McConnell points to an 1873 case in which the Supreme 
Court, interpreting an 1863 Congressional law, unanimously held that a 
“nondiscrimination” requirement meant no segregation because segrega-
tion is inherently unequal.256  Even though this was not a Fourteenth 
Amendment case, but a statutory interpretation case, McConnell stresses 
the Court’s language regarding the railroad company’s sepa-
rate-but-equal argument: “an ingenious attempt to evade a compliance 
                                                          
 252.  Originalism, supra note 203, at 984. 
 253.  Id. at 960-62. 
 254.  Id. at 1017, 984. 
 255. See generally id. at 1060, 1105. 
 256.  Id. at 1117 (discussing Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873)); See also 
Originalist Case, supra note 203, at 457-58. 
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with the obvious meaning of the requirement.”257  This is apparently 
proof of “mainstream” views on segregation. 
However, as McConnell himself points out, the Reconstruction 
agenda diffused.258  The Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877 gave the 
southern states back their autonomy from the federal government as long 
as the states promised to protect blacks’ rights.259  In 1883, the Supreme 
Court invalidated the 1875 Civil Rights Act as unconstitutional, because 
“it constituted ‘direct and primary’ legislation of private conduct, where-
as the Fourteenth Amendment refers to the state provision of equal pro-
tection of the law.”260  In 1896, the Supreme Court handed down Plessy 
v. Ferguson, which, according to McConnell, “marked the effective re-
peal of the Fourteenth Amendment.”261 
Now comes the muddying of the waters.  The manner by which 
McConnell deals with the diffusion of the Reconstruction period’s en-
actments and ideals bears perhaps a little too close resemblance to what 
McConnell calls the “bait-and switch” game, of which he has accused 
his left of center foes.262  That is, McConnell appears to be operating se-
lectively so as to use that which favors his desired outcome, disregarding 
the history, legislation, and cases which he finds unhelpful or simply 
“wrong.” 
There is tension between his two positions.  First, the contention is 
that courts should, on the one hand, follow the example of the original 
founders and defer to the will of the people (traditionalism) rather than 
creating new law.  On the other hand, his assertion is that the original 
Constitution was not even “fulfilled” until the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.263  By that reasoning, one may deduce that: 1) The original found-
                                                          
 257.  Originalism, supra note 203, at 1118 (citing Brown, 84 U.S. at 452). 
 258.  McConnell contends that Bruce Ackerman’s theory that there were three “constitutional 
moments” which created our constitutional rules (the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal) 
is incomplete: There was also the “forgotten” moment when Reconstruction ended.  McConnell 
illustrates in The Forgotten Constitutional Moment that according to Ackerman’s criteria for what 
can constitute a “moment”, the end of reconstruction fits.  McConnell, however, criticises Acker-
man’s theory that only at particular “moments” our constitutional tradition was created.  See Mo-
ment, supra note 249, at 140-44. 
 259.  Thereafter, of course, the southern states did not quite live up to the standards the Union 
had wanted.  One example is the segregation laws which started to be passed in the 1880’s.  Id. at 
132. 
 260.  Id. at 137 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)). 
 261.  Id. at 140 (effective repeal of Fourteenth Amendment). 
 262.  See, e.g., Reading, supra note 224, at 360: “Judicial review is not an intergenerational 
game of bait-and switch”.  See alsoMcConnell, supra note 95, infra 155, where he accuses other 
panelists, particularly Ackerman of this ignoble practice. 
 263.  While McConnell has used the term “extension”, see, e.g., Moment, supra note 249, at 
142 n.93, to describe the Reconstruction Amendments (which includes the Fourteenth, he has also 
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ers did not actually follow the will of the people, since their Constitution 
was unable to be “fulfilled” due to slavery (this reminds us of what Bal-
kin said about the Constitution being a compromise264); or, 2) Only the 
Madisonian founders (who urged a federal veto over state laws to protect 
rights265) had it “right,” and the Constitution up to the Reconstruction 
was in a sense “wrong” or at least incomplete.  This would imply that a 
priori there are intrinsically (moral) “right and wrong” answers; or, 3) 
The original Constitution did reflect the will of the people (who did not 
want a powerful federal government), but that the people were “wrong” 
because the Constitution could not be “fulfilled” until there was a federal 
veto over state laws; or, 4) Sometimes it is alright to break traditionalist 
rules when something such as slavery is at issue. 
McConnell appears to especially favor number four.266  He has 
written that “[s]ome issues are so fundamental to basic justice that they 
must be taken out of majoritarian control altogether.”267  This is because 
democracy itself cannot be trusted with some matters.268  He may be ar-
guing that the view at the founding regarding state versus federal power 
was “much more divided and ambivalent” than today  (after Brown).  
For today the federal government is understood “to be our system’s pri-
mary protector of individual liberties.”269 However, this leaves us won-
dering if “We the People” changed our minds about the role of the fed-
eral government, or did someone decide to take things out of our 
majoritarian control and insinuate some establishmentarianism into the 
system? 
Perhaps the tension can be answered by focusing on McConnell’s 
moral realism: “I am . . . a moral realist: one who believes in rights as in 
some sense real or natural, not just conventional; rights as connected in 
some way with what our most reflective and dedicated thinking proposes 
about the truth concerning simple justice or human nature.’”270 
                                                          
stated that the Fourteenth was the “culmination”, see, e.g., The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 
250, at 1160, and “fulfillment” of the Madisonian Constitution which could not pass in 1787, see, 
e.g., id. at 1167. 
 264.  McConnell expressly has rejected the idea that the Constitution is “a mishmash of politi-
cal compromises or a congeries of inscrutable phrases,” Perry, supra note 204, at 1525. 
 265.  See generally The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 250, at 1165-66 (Madison urged a 
federal veto over state law). 
 266.  Though one could probably draw the conclusion that he agrees with any one of the above 
deductions. 
 267.  Evaluating, supra note 222, at 1506 (giving as an example that both state and federal 
governments cannot pass ex post facto laws and bills of attainder). 
 268.  Id. at 1507. 
 269.  Id. at 1501. 
 270.  Moral Realist, supra note 212, at 90 (reacting to and quoting Sotirios Barber, The Ninth 
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McConnell has told us repeatedly that his moral realism does not allow 
judicially enforceable unenumerated rights.271  He has also told us that 
democracy itself cannot be trusted with some issues.  So then, if in some 
matters the federal lawmakers, the state lawmakers, and the judiciary 
cannot be trusted, what is left to turn to?  The executive?  Unlikely. 
McConnell must mean that the Constitution itself holds the an-
swers.  He has, after all, stated quite clearly that some court opinions up-
held laws, which were “unconstitutional” (such as Plessy and Miners-
ville) while other courts struck down laws that were “constitutional” 
(such as Dred Scott and Lochner).272  The Plessy court, for example, was 
apparently incorrect in claiming to base its decision on “established us-
ages, customs and traditions of the people” when the Jim Crow laws 
were only “of very recent vintage” because tradition, apparently, is not 
always enough.273  And in any case, discrimination is one of those ex-
ceptions in which the Constitution holds the key but “We the People” 
got it wrong. 
Some of the people.  Others, apparently, had it “right.”  McConnell 
applauds the Reconstruction period as an era when majoritarian opinion 
was stamped unconstitutional.  Put another way, minority opinions were 
constitutionalized.  For instance, the Fifteenth Amendment gave blacks 
the right to vote, when the majority opposed it.274  “This was a time 
when a political minority, armed with the prestige of victory in the Civil 
War and with military control over the political apparatus of the rebel 
states, imposed constitutional change on the Nation as the price of reun-
ion, with little regard for popular opinion.”275  The Reconstruction peri-
od and its goals is an exception to the traditionalism and “no judicial leg-
islation” rules because the judiciary should engage in political morality 
to support a desired outcome, even if that outcome does stem from a mi-
norities’ opinion. 
So, sometimes McConnell attacks court opinions for “making” law 
rather than following traditionalism.  However, on occasion, he embrac-
es court opinions, like Brown, for “getting it right.”  On the other hand, 
                                                          
Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67, 70 (1988)). 
 271.  See, e.g., id. 
 272.  See Right to Die, supra note 214, at 688-89 . 
 273.  Originalism, supra note 203, at 984 (citation omitted). 
 274.  Klarman, supra note 203, at 1939.  McConnell used this example to refute today’s  ma-
joritarian opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to eradicate segregation just be-
cause segregation was popular when it was ratified; the Fifteenth clearly gave blacks the right to 
vote despite tradition of the time.  Of course, by 1900 the Fifteenth Amendment was also a “dead 
letter”, see Moment, supra note 249, at 131 
 275.  Klarman, supra note 203, at 1939. 
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judges should not follow their own political morality because that vio-
lates federalism, democracy, and the founders’ intent.  However, in the 
exception cases, judges should side with the political minorities and take 
control into their own hands, even if it means abandoning the federalist 
system and majority opinion.  Sometimes it is all right to rewrite the fed-
eralist system,276 because sometimes the Constitution holds the keys 
which, apparently, have been misplaced, and because sometimes the 
Constitution is “unfulfilled.”  Because it can also happen that some peo-
ple had it “right” (like Madison) while others (like the people) had it 
“wrong.”  In the final analysis, is McConnell not just insinuating his 
own brand of “establishmentarianism” into the system? 
2.  And What He Says Now 
Unlike other Panelists, McConnell’s panel opinion itself does not 
so much stand in stark contrast to what he has written prior to it, because 
it is little more than a summary of his previous articles on the subject.  A 
major problem is that McConnell gave a court-type legal decision in the 
first place - particularly one which concurs with the majority.  A second 
problem is that McConnell engages in the kind of selectivity of sources 
of law with an eye on outcome, which he criticizes others for doing. 
There seems also to be a tension between McConnell’s position on 
Brown and Bolling.  In his analysis of Bolling v. Sharpe, McConnell 
maintains that Congress intended to divest the Court of power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment and reserve the power of primary enforcer 
for Congress, because Congress was not pleased with the Court’s history 
(i.e., Dred Scott).  If Congress intended to divest the Court of power to 
decide cases seeking enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment issues, is it 
not inconsistent then for the Court to decide Brown at all on the basis of 
the intent of Congress?  Should McConnell not be writing a dissenting 
opinion which states that the Court has no jurisdiction here?277 
Other problems arise.  We may recall that the purpose of the Panel 
was to rewrite Brown, knowing what you do about the course of history.  
Now recall that McConnell has previously told us that in 1997, the 
Washington Court cleaned up the substantive due process/unenumerated 
rights problem created by Roe in 1973.  Therefore, we now know that 
judges cannot make decisions based on their own political morality.  
                                                          
 276.  Such as what the Fourteenth Amendment did, giving the federal government what had 
been in the states’ hands for over a hundred years. 
 277.  Maybe he could have said that, alas, jurisdiction existed to decide that there was no prop-
er jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction to decide the case had been granted improvidently. 
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Judges must defer to traditionalist factors.  Was McConnell keeping that 
important lesson of history in mind when rewriting Brown? 
McConnell finds the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which 
the Brown Court found incorporated equal protection, irrelevant to the 
District of Columbia.  McConnell might distinguish Bolling, saying that 
unlike Brown, Bolling is not a constitutional question, but one of a statu-
tory interpretation.  That is, the school boards in the District of Columbia 
lacked statutory authority to segregate because Congress has never 
passed any law authorizing or requiring segregation.  Unless Congress 
explicitly says so, “federal agencies [cannot] depart from general princi-
ples of equal protection of the laws.”278  However, seemingly in contra-
diction, McConnell has admitted that the Court is viewing it as a Four-
teenth Amendment issue by bringing in the “equal protection of the 
laws” issue in his Panel opinion.279  McConnell also holds in his opinion 
that the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause “prohibit de jure segregation of schools.”  McConnell can get no 
help from the intent of the Framers.  For, McConnell’s opinion then ar-
gues that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was passed upon the as-
surance that the political rights of all citizens were not protected.280 
McConnell is a little less clear on the intent of the Citizenship Clause, 
stating that there is virtually no discussion by the Framers of the Citizen-
ship Clause. 
But there is an even larger problem than McConnell claiming Bol-
ling is not a Constitutional question when in reality he is treating it as 
one.  If the Fourteenth Amendment gave enforcement powers to Con-
gress, and not to the Court, then what is wrong with Congress’s decision 
not to prohibit segregation?  Does it not follow that, because Congress 
failed to prohibit segregation, it therefore intended to allow segregation?  
McConnell goes on to explain we should “avoid anomalous conflicts” 
between citizens within the state and federal spheres.  This sounds like 
the “unthinkable” argument in reverse for which McConnell attacked 
another Panelist.  What the Panel has done is strip Congress of powers, 
just like the Court did in Dred Scott.  Just like it is not supposed to be 
doing, or, at least like McConnell says it is not supposed to be doing.  
There must be something out there that prevents this.  Could it be the 
Fourteenth Amendment?   
                                                          
 278.  See McConnell, supra note 95. 
 279. See id. 
 280. But see Michaelman and Ackerman arguing that this fact, if true, is irrelevant. They assert 
that there are national rights of citizenship including desegregated education to be derived from 
these provisions.  See supra note 13. 
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McConnell takes refuge in humility.  Playing a Supreme Court Jus-
tice, McConnell attempts to portray humility, stating at the beginning of 
his opinion that this Court has no more foresight than past courts which 
made immoral decisions, and accordingly been “deknighted.”  He tells 
us that the Court can only “enforce rules imposed by others” and inter-
pret the Constitution, which is written in “understandable English” with 
“discernible purposes.”  But, of course, not all precedent must be fol-
lowed, since some courts and its decisions have been deknighted.  So we 
must ignore such cases as Dred Scott, which read the Constitution “fan-
cifully,” Plessy, which “turned its back on the original promise of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” and Slaughterhouse, which had a “dubious in-
terpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”  Yes, it is “impos-
sible to tell” whether the language of the Fourteenth Amendment [writ-
ten, recall, in understandable English with discernible purposes] required 
segregation.  But McConnell is quite confident in saying that “segrega-
tion is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
McConnell states that he is only reminding us of the deknighted 
former courts in order to warn against hubris.  He wants to exhibit the 
unconstitutional and immoral wrongs, which can be and unfortunately 
have been committed when the Supreme Court grants itself too much 
power to judicially legislate.  He apparently wants to reassure us that this 
Court (or at least himself) is doing everything possible to avoid such ca-
lamities from reoccurring, because after all, this Court recognizes hubris. 
Should we be as confident that McConnell has eliminated hubris 
when he announces that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment  “prohibits de jure segregation of schools” de-
spite Slaughterhouse and the fact that no court has relied on the clause 
for this purpose since then?  Can we rest easily when he states that the 
Sumner-Butler bill votes enact the “mainstream view” of the Recon-
struction period against the constitutionality of school segregation, not-
withstanding a declaration that the Reconstruction party itself was a mi-
nority?281  Is everyone comfortable with McConnell’s presumption that 
the minority Reconstruction party was “right” even though its efforts 
were relatively quickly diffused?  Can we easily ignore the opinion of 
the people throughout centuries and their representative legislative bod-
ies, especially those in the South, because they were “wrong,” and the 
democratic process cannot be trusted in some circumstances?282  If we 
                                                          
 281.  Klarman, supra note 203, at 1939. 
 282.  Recall that one of  the biggest problems with Dworkin and his followers is that Dworkin 
allowed judges to decide what is right for the nation and utterly disregard the fact that the legislature 
speaking in majority cloak had passed laws to the contrary.  Dworkin, supra note 204, at 1273. 
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can do that in these circumstances, why not do it in others?  Is there real-
ly no problem with allowing the Court to place the decision-making 
power on that issue of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment upon itself 
even though Section 5 of the Amendment grants that power to Con-
gress?  To “bait-and-switch” is prohibited, but is it acceptable to choose 
which parts of history one likes, even if it is a “minority” Reconstruction 
party which “We the People” decided to diffuse?  And is there no hubris 
in bringing back to life in the year 1954 an Amendment, which was “ef-
fectively repealed” in 1896?283 
McConnell apparently thinks not.  On the other hand, there is a ra-
ther uncanny resemblance to “selective postmodernism” and its entan-
glements with establishmentarianism.  Is it not selectivity run rampant, 
and the use of state power to do the forbidden establishmentarianism that 
is all right if he is doing the “establishing?” Would it not be better if 
McConnell simply listened to his own advice and “resigned” from the 
Court? 
McConnell was borrowing from Legal Realism when he accused 
the Court of manipulation to delegitimate the role of the Supreme Court 
in the legal process.  This was the essence of his heated exchange with 
Ackerman.  McConnell preferred to do his own manipulation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, declaring it the exclusive province of Congress.  
Having done that, he preferred to manipulate the importance of Congres-
sional silence by analogy to some Commerce Clause rhetoric.  Some-
times where Congress is silent on Commerce Clause issues the states 
may not act because Congressional silence precludes state action. 
Does he take all this seriously? When Professor McConnell was 
confronted with the challenge that his position isolated him on the Panel, 
he chuckled and said there had to be some controversy on the Panel.  In 
the question session, McConnell critiqued Ackerman’s presentation by 
pointing out that the Supreme Court could not just send out a decree and 
expect everyone to salute.  The legal process required a process of rea-
soned elaboration that was not bait-and-switch. 
McConnell objected strenuously to Ackerman’s use of the Privileg-
es and Immunity Clause and the Citizenship Clause in his argument.  
The essence was that it was manipulation, for the Court and its academic 
apologists could not say that Brown was about education one day, and 
that it was about public golf courses and swimming pools the next.  He 
also found it reprehensible to hold that Brown was based on the citizen-
ship right of American nationals because of the Citizenship Clause on 
                                                          
 283.  Moment, supra note 249, at 140. 
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Monday, and on Tuesday, Brown meant that immigrants had a right to 
an education, even though they were not citizens.  Ackerman was visibly 
disturbed at McConnell’s attack.  Ackerman believed what he was doing 
was in line with precedent and McConnell was wrong to question this.  
What McConnell is offering is a cry for limiting the Court in favor of the 
decrees of Congress and other elected bodies or so he may like to be 
heard.   
The problem is that McConnell has manipulated the canon, intro-
ducing a loose cannon on the deck.  That loose cannon is the reference to 
selected legislative acts (e.g., Sumner-Butler) and selected legislative 
behavior (e.g., votes on segregation of transportation).  He has not suc-
cessfully explained away the significance of the diffusion of the Recon-
structionist program after the Hayes-Tilden Compromise in his argument 
about the “forgotten Constitutional moment.”  Problems in his analysis 
continue when he finds that Congress meant to reserve jurisdiction for 
itself in racial matters, because he then plays a Supreme Court Justice 
and writes an opinion exercising the very jurisdiction that he said was 
reserved for the legislature.  Finally, he accuses others of manipulation, 
but does a fine job himself of injecting his moralism into the Brown 
opinion after criticizing others for making moral judgments in the form 
of law. 
D.  Professor John Ely 
Professor Ely displays abiding contradiction because he attacks the 
Court for substantive due process type arguments, while affirming the 
Brown opinion.  This is mind-boggling.  He has the audacity to argue for 
a process-oriented jurisprudence based on allowing access to minorities 
to the legislative and executive process, attack a morally based “substan-
tive” Court decision process, and at the same time affirm Brown because 
separate is not equal!  As if this is not enough for a good day’s work, Ely 
trashes the legislative and executive branches’ failure to live up to sepa-
ration of powers dictates.  This might be all in a day’s work, except he 
restricts the Supreme Court to process decisions, meaning the legislature 
gets deference, which Ely argues it does not deserve because legislatures 
are not concerned with policy, only re-election. 
As a self-proclaimed moderate,284 advocate of  “activist” legal pro-
                                                          
 284. JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 475 n.16 (1996) [hereinafter ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND], “Of course I confess to being a moderate myself. . . .”  (This book is 
cited with some hesitancy, since Ely specifically requested it be cited, id. at  363.) 
54
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/2
MACGRADY1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:50 PM 
2002] ANOTHER COUNCIL OF NICAEA? 425 
cess,285 and a long-standing fan of the Warren Court,286 Professor John 
Hart Ely fit well as an ecumenical panelist.  Ely was given the honor of 
speaking last at the Brown panel.  As “batting clean-up,”287 his speech 
was short, but not necessarily sweet.  He may have been well-advised to 
have chosen those relatively few words more carefully.  His Panel argu-
ment not only did not internally support itself, but it lacked support from 
what he had previously written. 
In summary, Professor Ely presents a puzzling analysis which: 1) 
attacks Congress for having abdicated its role as a policy-maker but at 
the same time affirms it as better suited than the Supreme Court to de-
cide policy matters; 2) advocates a process approach which stresses the 
access of discrete and insular minorities to voting rights and similar ac-
cess problems; 3) at the same time attacks the Court for Lochner-type 
substantive due process value judgments; 4) despite 2 and 3 manages to 
affirm Brown, which is clearly not an access to the political process 
case!  Ely attacks Brown’s sociological footnote in his writings, but de-
cides ex cathedra that it was correct in its finding of inherent harm in his 
Panel opinion.  So, Ely managed a difficult feat in affirming Brown.288 
1.  What He Wrote Before 
According to Ely’s argument, essentially one of separation of pow-
ers, the Constitution’s overwhelming purpose was to outline governmen-
tal procedure and to ensure citizens’ access to it and not to select sub-
stantive values.289  Substantive values are the jurisdiction of the 
                                                          
 285. See, e.g., id. at 361. 
 286. Aside from the fact that Ely clerked for Warren, Ely has also applauded the Warren Court 
for its approach to the democratic process: “Other Courts had recognized the connection be-
tween . . . political activity and the proper functioning of the democratic process; the Warren Court 
was the first seriously to act upon it.”  John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode 
of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 452-3 (1978). 
 287. See Ely, supra note 26. 
 288. Ely may have anticipated problems in his approach.  Having clerked for Justice Warren, 
he is able to quote an oral statement of Warren:  if Reynolds v. Sims had been decided before Brown, 
Brown would have been unnecessary.  See The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974).  Ely wanted 
to argue that process and access are the key, and substantive rights are not the proper object of the 
Court’s concern.  Unfortunately for Ely, this gets him nowhere in affirming the substantive rights 
decision in Brown.  
 289. Ely maintains that the original Constitution’s substantive provisions are few, and protect 
only very limited values: corruption of blood is forbidden (one cannot be punished for one’s par-
ents’ transgressions), the federal and state governments cannot tax exported articles, and slavery 
was protected at least up to 1808.  Ely maintains that the Bill of Rights is about separation of pow-
ers, not substantive rights.  The Eighteenth Amendment did add temperance, but was repealed by 
the Twenty-first Amendment—another example that substantive values just don’t work in the Con-
stitution.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 92-101 (Harvard Univ. Press 1980) [here-
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legislative and executive branches—the political process.290  Therefore, 
“preserving fundamental values is not an appropriate constitutional 
task.”291  The courts’ job is to actively enforce “every clause in the Con-
stitution,” but not to enforce clauses absent from it, regardless of the ap-
parent distaste for the legislation in question.292  Though some critical 
Constitutional phrases need external sources to be given shape,293 open-
ended clauses are not blank checks for courts; otherwise, as Ely wrote, 
“we might as well stop pretending we are in any significant respect a 
democracy.”294  The backbone of this separation of powers structure is 
the evasion of power accumulation in one governmental branch295—
which would be the tyranny that the Framers’ were escaping through the 
Declaration of Independence from England.  When it comes to separa-
tion of powers, there can be no adverse possession arguments.296 
So courts, as laid out under Article III’s cases and controversies re-
quirement, cannot create broad rules.  Courts may only apply Constitu-
tional or statutory law.297  The important exception is when it comes to 
the protection of minorities—or, as Carolene Products footnote 4 puts it, 
“discrete and insular minorities.”298  In other words, courts may step in 
and undo legislation (substantive values) that in some way discriminate 
against those who are politically powerless.  The reason for this excep-
                                                          
inafter DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST].  See also DUXBURY, supra note 18, at 291, where it is pointed 
out that so-called process rights involve substantive value choices. 
 290. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 87: 
“contrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution as ‘an enduring but evolving statement 
of general values’, is that in fact the selection and accommodation of substantive values is left al-
most entirely to the political process and instead the document is overwhelmingly concerned, on the 
one hand, with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes . . . and on the other . . . 
with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government.” 
 291. Id. at 88. 
 292. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 280. 
 293.  John Hart Ely, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, in The Supreme Court 
1977 Term 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 5 (1978) [hereinafter “Fundamental Values”]. 
 294. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 297. 
 295. “We would do well to heed [the framers’] warning that, in calm and anxious ages alike, 
the ‘accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of 
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced 
the very definition of tyranny.”  Id. at 135 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison)). 
 296. John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted A War Powers Act that Worked 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1379, 1390-91 (1988) [hereinafter “War Powers Act”]. 
 297. See, e.g., ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 122, “Roughly, Article III, by 
limiting federal courts to cases and controversies, tells them, at least in theory, two things.  First, 
they—unlike the legislature—may not create broad rules; they must content themselves with apply-
ing the law, either statutory or constitutional, to the particular disputes before them.  And second, 
because they are restricted to adjudicating the rights of litigants before them, they can act only retro-
spectively.” 
 298. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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tion, Ely informs us, is that the Constitution and our forbearers consid-
ered equality very important (leaving slavery aside).299  Article IV’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause operate as 
equality provisions, “guaranteeing virtual representation to the political-
ly powerless.”300  And of course there is the Equal Protection Clause, but 
that was not intended to be about specific applications, either; it was a 
general rule to be worked out by posterity.301 
Ely has maintained that Carolene Products’ footnote 4 foreshad-
owed the Warren Court.302  The Warren Court was concerned with en-
suring that all have access to the political process and correcting certain 
forms of discrimination, not with vindicating any particular substantive 
values.303  Ely tells us that Warren allegedly once said, “A concern with 
process, seriously pursued, can lead in some quite ‘activist’ direc-
tions.”304  The hallmark ruling being, of course, Brown. 
The logic starts becoming fuzzy at this point.  Ely has written that 
the Equal Protection Clause “is largely to protect against substantive out-
rages by requiring that those who would harm others must at the same 
time harm themselves.”305  The Fourteenth Amendment’s central con-
cern was eradicating prejudicial thinking which creates “racial classifica-
tions that disadvantage minorities.”306  Yet none of these descriptions of 
Equal Protection a priori mandate school segregation’s illegitimacy or 
unconstitutionality.  Desegregation may have hurt blacks by giving them 
insecurities in that environment, but experts on the side of anti-
desegregation in Brown had good credentials and intentions, too.307  But 
let’s consider Ely’s views a little further.  Ely has long been clear that he 
                                                          
 299. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 79, 122 (“many among the 
framers stressed the importance to the system they were forging of the equal representation of equal 
population groups.”  Interestingly, Ely does not leave aside our forbearers’ sexism). 
 300. Id. at 90-91. 
 301. “[T]he overriding intention of those who wrote and ratified the Equal Protection Clause 
was apparently to state a general ideal whose specific applications would be supplied by posterity.  
They surely entertained no specific intention that the Equal Protection Clause would cover an-
timicegenation laws, or for that matter segregated schooling either.”  Id. at 119. 
 302. See, e.g., id. at 75.  See also Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 5-6.  “Generally 
speaking, the Warren Court was a Carolene Products Court, centrally concerned with assuring 
broad participation, not simply in the processes of government but in the benefits generated by those 
processes as well.” 
 303. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 74. 
 304. See, e.g., Ely, 88 HARV. L. REV. at 12. 
 305. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 170. 
 306. Id. at 137, n.11 (citing Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 307. John Hart Ely, If at First You Don’t Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time?  Group 
Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 216 
(1998) [hereinafter “Loving”]. 
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does not believe in substantive due process.308  The Constitution is not 
and was not intended to be about fundamental substantive values.309  
Values are not “out there” for courts to find.310  Ely has inferred that the 
closer the Court has come to overt substantive rights, the worse the 
Court’s performance has been.311  He has termed Lochner the “blasphe-
my of blasphemies.”312  Furthermore, Ely has pointed out that although 
part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose was to overturn Dred 
Scott’s holding that blacks are not citizens, that does not tell us anything 
about “the framers’ views on the decision’s invocation (as opposed to its 
application) of the concept of substantive due process.”313  In other 
words, Dred Scott is not precedent for substantive due process advo-
cates.  
Ely has also been clear that he favors “a more rule-oriented ap-
proach” to courts’ application of Constitutional law.  Rules carry ad-
vantages such as predictability, economy, and equality of treatment.  
Rules are even worth, Ely concedes, the “occasional doubtful result.”314  
Ely has complained that courts ’do not often enough make “coherent and 
applicable tests.”315  Yet, Ely has denounced just about every significant 
                                                          
 308. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization 
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis.  88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1483 n.5 (1975) [hereinafter 
“Flag Desecration”]. 
 309. See supra note 289. 
 310. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 21. 
 311. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 57 n.66, “Indeed, a case can be made that 
the closer the Court has come to overt fundamental-values reasoning the less impressively it has 
performed.”  (citing Scott v. Sanford, 60 How. 393 (1857); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 312. Ely, supra note 286, at 474 n.88 (1970). 
 313. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 16 n.19. 
 314. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 85: 
“Unsurprisingly, I am with those who counsel a return of a more rule-oriented approach.  Of course 
the return should be a careful one: there is little point in formulating a rule unless and until the 
courts’ experience and past analysis of the area in question can give them confidence that they will 
get it about right.  Where they are possible, though, rules seems as preferable here as they do in oth-
er areas of law.  The advantages they bring—advantages of predictability, economy, and equality of 
treatment as between one case and another—seem ‘worth the price of the occasional doubtful re-
sult.’” (citing Willis L. M. Reese, “Choice of Law: Rules or Approach,” 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 
326-27 (1972).  See also John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting Its 
Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 212-13 (1981) (citing Reese, 57 CORNELL L. REV. at 322)).  
An example of an occasional doubtful result: Ely has insinuated that O.J. Simpson was guilty but 
went free because the reasonable doubt standard gave him an edge—O.J’s wealth gave him an ad-
vantage which is the exception, but O.J’s walking free is the price we must pay for giving ordi-
nary—poor—defendants a “fighting chance.”  ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 
230-31. 
 315. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 174.  See also Flag Desecration, supra 
note 307, at 1484. 
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Constitutional law test the Court has handed down.  He has called Bal-
ancing Tests “simply not the stuff on which assurance can confidently be 
built.”316  Dominant Purpose Tests are “simply vague and manipulative” 
and “incoherent.”317  Rationality Tests “should be abandoned.”318 
The defects Ely finds in the system run much deeper than the judi-
cial branch and its substantive due process, favorite Constitutional Tests, 
and general lack of rules.  Ely’s writings display a much broader concern 
with the governmental separation of powers structure,319 and each 
branch’s exercise of authority within it, or lack thereof.  He has exten-
sively and consistently criticized each branch of government—the legis-
lative, the executive, and the judicial—for straying far outside their Con-
stitutionally sanctioned bounds.   
According to Ely, Congress not only has no problem with hesitating 
to “involve itself in controversies it retains the legal discretion to 
avoid,”320 but, as will be discussed shortly, it also avoids many of the 
controversies it does not have the legal discretion to avoid.  Congress is 
basically worried about being reelected and keeping important constitu-
ents happy, not about big national issues having difficult to detect re-
sults.321  Ely has noted that 97% of Congress are reelected, while state 
judges get kicked out of office, “because both ‘branches’ have evolved 
to the point where [Congress has] less to do with difficult and conspicu-
ous political choices.”322  There is a virtual consensus in recent decades 
among political scientists and other observers, Ely has pointed out, that 
Congress has essentially lost its policy-making ability.323  (Nonetheless, 
and confusingly, Ely has elsewhere written that “most of the important 
                                                          
 316. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 185.  See also Flag Desecration, supra 
note 307, at 1506. 
 317. John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 
611 (1998). 
 318. John Hart Ely, Another Spin on Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 107,110 n.10 
(1990).  See also, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 121 (“The usual demand of the 
Equal Protection Clause is simply that the discrimination in question be rationally explainable).” 
 319. See, e.g., John Hart Ely,  Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a 
World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 863 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter “Another Such Victory”].  “There’s enough of a trend . . . to suggest that we have a problem with 
respect to the separation of powers.” 
 320. Id. at 867 n.104. 
 321. Id. at 856-57.  “Congressmen know that the specific impact of broad national policies on 
their districts is difficult to see, that effects are hidden, so to speak . . . .  Thus, in order to attain 
reelection, congressmen focus on things that are both more recognizable in their impact and more 
credible indicators of the individual congressman’s power—federal projects and individual favors 
for constituents.  As the mix has shifted, the reelection rate has gone up enormously.” 
 322. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 488 n.99. 
 323. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 855. 
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policy decisions are made by our elected representatives (or by people 
accountable to them).”324)  Congress’ preferred policy-making method is 
to follow the New Deal plan of establishing new executive bureaucracies 
to deal with things.325  The executive, in effect, ends up doing a bulk of 
the legislating: much law is actually “made by the legions of unelected 
administrators whose duty it becomes to give operative meaning to the 
broad delegations the statutes contain.”326  The bureaucracies then carry 
responsibility and blame rather than legislatures. 
Further, Congress disfavors Supreme Court nominees who, like 
Bork, want Congress to make decisions.  It’s easier on Congress if they 
can place the blame on the Court.327  “Thus, legislators can express sym-
pathy with individual constituents of all persuasions without incurring 
heavy costs at the next election.”328 Congress has not exercised its ability 
to limit the courts’ jurisdiction in over 100 years.329  In effect, the Sen-
ate’s “sole appropriate test of judicial performance,” Ely has informed 
his readers, is “the political desirability of the outcomes reached.”330  
Naturally, Congress’ checks on the Court have not proved to be of much 
consequence.331 
Congress has also been dodging its important Constitutional re-
sponsibility of deciding on war and peace since 1950.332  This time Con-
gress has handed over its responsibilities to the executive, rather than the 
judicial branch.  (Incidentally, the courts have been avoiding the war and 
peace issue, too.333)  Again, the Senate’s principle priorities in this area 
have been “keeping (a) out of the line of fire, and (b) their jobs.”334 
In 1950, the Truman Administration “not only claimed unprece-
dented unilateral authority to commit our troops to combat” in Korea, 
but it “even went so far as to suggest that Congress lacked authority to 
                                                          
 324. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 4. 
 325. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 857-58. 
 326. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 131. 
 327. See Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 860-61. 
 328. Id. at 861. 
 329. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 19. 
 330.  Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 849  (discussing Reagan). 
 331. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 19. 
 332. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 145-46, 149.  The power to declare war 
is Constitutionally vested in Congress.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY.  WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 
(Princeton Univ. Press 1993) [hereinafter WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY]. 
 333.  ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 151.  Ely elsewhere wrote that the 
Court has “every business insisting that the officials the Constitution entrusts with [the war making] 
decision be the ones who make it.”  WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 54. 
 334. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 359-60. 
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stop it!”335  Congress, of course, in time was voting special appropria-
tions and draft extensions, which amounted to consent.336 
In 1964, Congress passed the Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolu-
tion, granting the Johnson Administration full authority “to take all nec-
essary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United 
States and prevent further aggression” in Vietnam.337  Congress had 
been misled by the executive about the state of affairs in the Tonkin Gulf 
prior to and during the war,338 however, even such apparent fraud does 
not nullify Congress’ responsibility for what happened during the Vi-
etnam War.  It was Congress’ job to investigate the Tonkin Gulf situa-
tion prior to, or at least during the extended war.  “That’s why we have 
separate branches.  That’s why the war power is vested in Congress.”339  
Congress also ignored its responsibilities when it came to the “secret” 
war in Laos.  Enough Congressmen, Ely maintains, knew that something 
was going on to have launched an investigation.340 
In 1971, Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.  “To a leg-
islature unwilling either to stop the war or to take responsibility for it, 
the prospect of getting that incriminating Tonkin Gulf Resolution off the 
books must have seemed a godsend.”341  Bombing in Cambodia contin-
ued until August 1973.342  Ely claims that Nixon should have been im-
peached for waging war in Cambodia, not for tapping phones.  Again, 
Congress was not doing its job.343 
The 1973 War Powers Resolution, engineered to force Congress to 
live up to its Constitutional duties, has failed.  Presidents have evaded 
their duties under it, and Congress and the courts have done nothing to 
stop them.344  President Bush did get approval for Desert Storm, but Ely 
                                                          
 335. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 10 (citing Hearings on Assignment of 
Ground Forces of the U.S. to Duty in the European Area before the Senate Comms. on Foreign Re-
lations and Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 88-93 (1951) (testimony of Secretary Acheson)). 
 336. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 11. 
 337. Id. at 15-16 (citing 78 Stat. 384 (1964)) (italics omitted). 
 338. Id. at 19. 
 339. Id. at 20. 
 340. Id. at 95, “Various members of Congress knew various things about various aspects of 
it—surely enough to have triggered a further investigation if they’d been doing their job.” 
 341. John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality 
of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 907 (1990). 
 342. Id. at 908. 
 343. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 104. 
 344. Id. at 48-49. The Resolution mandates that the President inform Congress within 48 hours 
of introducing troops “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances.”  Within 60 days, extendable to 90 days, the President must 
withdraw troops unless Congress declares war.  Presidents have repeatedly either failed to file a 
report, or have filed a “vague statement pointedly refusing to identify itself as a [Resolution] “hos-
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asserts that this is only because he knew in advance that he would get 
approval, and because Bush would have invaded regardless.345  More re-
cently, President Clinton went into Bosnia without getting Congressional 
approval first.346  Ely terms the War Powers Resolution a “tale of Con-
gressional spinelessness.”347 
Ely explains that a tacit agreement has been in effect between the 
executive and legislative branches during post-World War II history.  
This agreement covers not just foreign policy.  The agreement is that the 
President can make most of the decisions as long as Congress does not 
have to be held accountable, and can even scold the President if some-
thing goes wrong.348  Congress likes the situation of being able to “play 
hide-and-complain.”349  The President gets what he wants, and Congress 
can spend its time with the (more important) business of reelection with-
out worrying too much about responsibility. 
More recently, Ely has attacked the Congress for its partisan behav-
ior.  Ely has noted that during the Clinton impeachment proceedings, the 
Senate and the House both voted in “disturbingly partisan ways.”350  Ely 
commented, “I don’t know about you, but when Chief Justice Rehnquist 
entered the Senate Chamber, I felt much as I did at the end of William 
Golding’s Lord of the Flies: Thank God, everything’s going to be all 
right.  A grown up has arrived.”351 
However, Ely’s description of the Court’s behavior does not sound 
like he considers it particularly “grown up.”  Throughout history, Ely 
has told us, the Court has been warned to “stick to its knitting or risk de-
struction”—but the Court continues to acquire power and nothing has 
ever changed, even in the Warren years.352  In 1978 Ely noted that since 
the Warren years, the Court’s power had continually grown to the 
strongest it had probably ever been.353  Despite Hamilton’s vision in the 
                                                          
tilities” report (with the result that the sixty-day clock was not deemed to have been started).”  Con-
gress has essentially done nothing about this. 
 345. Id. at 50-51. 
 346. See ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 150. 
 347. War Powers Act, supra note 296, at 1419.  In Ely’s revised draft (proposal) of the War 
Powers Resolution, he requires courts to come into the process when the President or Congress are 
not playing by the rules.  WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 125, 130-31, 135. 
 348. WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 332, at 54. 
 349. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 150. 
 350. John Hart Ely, The Apparent Inevitability of Mixed Government, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
283, 288 n.28 (1999). 
 351. Id. at 289. 
 352. See Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 21.  See also DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 
supra note 289, at 47-48. 
 353. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 21. 
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Federalist 78 that the judiciary would have no influence over sword or 
purse, formal checks on the Court have not been consequential.354  In 
short, the Court has been getting away with intervening in legislative 
functions.355  This is wrong because, as Ely has asserted, legislatures are 
clearly better situated to reflect popular consensus356 and courts are not 
constructed to measure popular morality.357  (Does this reflect a Court 
that can prevail because it is “grown up”?) 
Perhaps it makes sense why judges today are chosen primarily for 
how they will vote on particular issues.358  This is dangerous because 
judges, like legislators, are human and “it is sometimes difficult for them 
to avoid unconsciously importing their personal loyalties and political 
convictions into their work.”359  Ely notes that, however, such transgres-
sions in the judiciary are “rare.”360  Perhaps. 
On the other hand, he has elsewhere noted that “[it] takes an unusu-
ally strong or apolitical judge to avoid being discernibly affected by her 
assessment of the politically desirable outcome.”361  Ely has used Justice 
Souter’s appointment as evidence that judicial appointments in recent 
decades are not about the legal process but about politics, and further 
notes things are unlikely to change.  Souter, unlike Bork, portrayed him-
self as a moderate.362  Hence, he received Congressional approval.  Ely 
is unwilling to accept completely Souter’s claims of moderacy, however.  
Ely has inferred that Souter must have had an opinion on Roe, despite 
Souter’s claims to the contrary.363  Ely apparently does not believe Su-
preme Court justices can be truly impartial. 
Ely certainly has offered plenty of examples which demonstrate 
such impartiality.  After the “blasphemy of blasphemies” Lochner,364 
and its some 200-case progeny, came Roe.  As Justice Stewart’s concur-
rence in that case concedes, and Ely agrees with, Roe is the product of 
Lochner—in other words, substantive due process.365  Roe’s most 
                                                          
 354. Id. at 19. 
 355. Id. at 22. 
 356. Id. at 49. 
 357. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 23. 
 358. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 843. 
 359. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 161. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 835-36 n.8. 
 362. Id. at 850-52. 
 363. See ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 492  n. 129. 
 364. Ely, supra note 286, at 474 n.88. 
 365. See, e.g., ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 291.  “The Court continues to 
disavow the philosophy of Lochner.  Yet as Justice Stewart’s concurrence admits, it is impossible 
candidly to regard Roe as the product of anything else.”  Ely claims to be a long time supporter of 
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“frightening” aspect is that its “super-protected right” (privacy right to 
abort) is not inferable from the Constitution’s language, the Framers’ 
thinking on the subject, any derivable Constitutional general values, or 
the nation’s governmental structure.366  The Roe Court, according to 
some members of the profession was “indulging in sheer acts of will, 
ramming its personal preferences down the country’s throat.”367  Roe is 
not Constitutional law, nor does it make much of an effort to be.368  Roe 
“amended” the Constitution, and the wrong tribunal did the amending.369 
There are many other examples, outside the substantive due process 
field.  For example, in 1971, writing on the Court’s decision in Harris v. 
New York,370 Ely commented that though reasonable persons can disa-
gree on the proper role of the Court, no one could disagree on the unde-
sirability of the Court’s “at best, gross negligence concerning the state of 
the record and the controlling precedents.”371  That opinion was “little 
more than a vote—a reflection of numerical power.”372  Ely tossed this 
“vote” up to the fact that Nixon’s judicial appointees wanted to reverse 
many of the holdings of the Warren Court.373  Leaving aside the number 
of 5-4 opinions we have seen, Ely attempts to reassure his readers that 
“decisions that fail to persuade often do not long outlast the men who 
wrote them.”374  Does that mean Roe will be overturned?  After all, the 
’Roe opinion was “simply not adequate.”375  No, Ely has told us that Roe 
is probably a steadfast decision.376  He has also told us that 5-4 decisions 
are (at least at times) the creatures of Presidential appointments and 
“chaos.”377 
                                                          
abortion.  See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade“”, 82 
YALE L.J. 920, 924 n.40 (1973) [hereinafter “Wages”]. 
 366. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 289. 
 367. Id. at 294. 
 368. Wages, supra note 365, at 947. 
 369. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 299. 
 370. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that statements elicited in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may be used to impeach). 
 371. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 212.  See also, Alan M. Dershowitz & 
John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the 
Emerging Nixon Majority “”80 Yale L.J. 1198, 1199-00 (1971) [hereinafter “Harris”]. 
 372. Harris, supra note 371, at 1226. 
 373. Id. at 1227. 
 374. Id. at 1226.  (Ely cannot be attacked for his failure to use a gender neutral term since po-
litical correctness had not come into vogue.) 
 375. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 283. 
 376. Id. at 296, “Roe v. Wade seems like a durable decision.” 
 377. Id. at 275, “Pena [an affirmative action case] was a 5-4 decision, however—the two Clin-
ton appointees numbering among the four dissenters—so presumably the chaos will continue [in the 
affirmative action field]”) . . . . 
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Then there was Erie.  Erie Railroad v. Tompkins378 is the famous 
1938 case which outlines the rule of when to use state or federal law in a 
diversity case; Erie is—in Ely’s words—the “very essence” of federal-
ism.379  Despite Erie’s fame—it is a mandatory citation for cases raising 
an issue with federal or state jurisdiction in diversity cases Ely claims 
that Erie “provides little guidance on such issues.”380  Ely explains that 
Erie was redefined by the Warren Court in Hanna v. Plumer in 1965.381  
However, Hanna “does not seem even remotely to capture Erie’s true 
meaning.”382  Nonetheless Erie—providing little guidance in the first 
place—has apparently survived the alteration Hanna did to it.  Why did 
Erie survive 1965 and retain its popularity?  Ely is willing to place that 
accomplishment largely with the prestige of a single judge, Justice Har-
lan, who concurred separately in Hanna.  How could the Warren Court 
alter a cornerstone federalism case (even if that case did not, allegedly, 
address the issue well), and how could a single justice in concurrence be 
responsible for that case surviving the Court’s alterations?  Well, the Su-
preme Court, Ely commented on this question, “is the Supreme 
Court.”383  Of course, Ely has noted that judges are free to change their 
minds, especially when they reach the Supreme Court,384 but are Su-
preme Court justices equally as entitled to overturn early Court rulings 
whenever they please?  It seems so.  Ely admits he has no “well-
developed” theory of when stare decisis should be invoked, and he does 
not think anyone else does, either.385  “” 
Then of course, there was Brown, which overruled Plessy.  As one 
who advocates for more rules, less judicial legislation, and generally 
stricter separation of powers, Ely’s support of Brown is at first blush 
confusing.  Ely has not unequivocally supported the Warren Court.386  
He has denounced all the per curium orders that came down soon after 
Brown on desegregating buses, golf courses, beaches, etc., as having lit-
tle if anything to do with how segregated schooling harms black chil-
                                                          
 378. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 379. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie“”, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974) [here-
inafter “Erie”]. 
 380. Id. at 707-08. 
 381. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 382. Erie, supra note 379, at 696-97.  Ely indicates that while Erie reaffirms federalism, Hanna 
“[saps] the strength from that system.”  Id. at 697 n.33. 
 383. Id. at 697 (presumably he means that they have that power). 
 384. See ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 223. 
 385. Id. at 305. 
 386. Though Ely did dedicate his seminal book DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, 
to Earl Warren. 
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dren.387  Ely has called Justice Warren himself “sexist” because Warren 
did not want a female law clerk.388  Ely’s critical attitude when it comes 
to the Warren Court’s post-Brown lack of legal process and Chief Justice 
Warren’s sexist attitude toward clerks is understandable.  Ely’s praise of 
Brown is not quite so. 
Ely admits that the Warren Court at times superimposed its value 
judgments but only “when liberty genuinely hung in the balance.”389  
Recall that judges should not impose substantive value judgments, and 
are not better reflectors of “conventional values.”390  Recall what Ely has 
told about the evils of judicial legislation and judges being appointed for 
political purposes.  Yet, he has nonetheless maintained that appointed 
judges are “comparative outsiders”  “largely removed from the political 
hurly-burly.”391  Judges have no “special pipeline” to the peoples’ val-
ues, and in fact their nonpolitical office keeps them from having such a 
pipeline.  Hence, objectivity.392  More or less.  Judges still are somewhat 
concerned, after all, with the next election,393 and are more like politi-
cians than they historically had been.394  This is confusing. 
The reasoning, of course, is that Brown is a Carolene Products note 
4 type case: when “there is a special reason to distrust the democratic 
process in a given case”395 —when discrete and insular minorities are at 
issue—then the Court may override legislation.  The Warren Court did 
not seek to impose fundamental values;396 the Warren Court was simply 
protecting minorities from a majority rule which discriminated against 
and harmed the minorities—that’s the Carolene Products spirit: “the 
value judgments of the majority [cannot be] the vehicle for protecting 
minorities from the value judgments of the majority.”397  So, there is no 
problem with the Warren Court superimposing its value judgments in 
Brown.  In fact, the Warren Court’s approach outlines the proper “inter-
pretivist” approach to dealing with open-ended Constitutional provi-
sions.398 
                                                          
 387. Loving, supra note 307, at 218. 
 388. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 334-35 (discussing when Ely was a 
clerk for Warren in 1964). 
 389. Id. at 4. 
 390. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 102. 
 391. Ely, supra note 286, at 487. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. at 487 n.124 
 394. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 355. 
 395. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 156 n.69. 
 396. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 21 n.77. 
 397. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 52 (emphasis omitted). 
 398. Ely, supra note 286, at 451, “An ‘interpretivist’ approach that would confine the Constitu-
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That leaves us with the question, still, of why Brown is a proper 
Carolene Products type case.  The Brown Court itself did not mention 
Carolene Products or its discrete and insular minorities.  Carolene 
Products’ discrete and insular minorities were actually not mentioned 
(after the original case) until 1971.399  The Brown Court based its Equal 
Protection argument solely upon the assumption that segregation in pub-
lic education does in fact harm black children because “a feeling of infe-
riority” is generated “as to their status in the community.”400  Plessy was 
quickly dismissed and rejected by looking to the authority of several 
contemporary social psychology studies.401 
The Brown Court probably did not cite to Carolene Products be-
cause Brown’s reasoning was not taken immediately from that case.  
Carolene Products’ note on strict scrutiny for legislation affecting dis-
crete and insular minorities simply laid the groundwork for what 
emerged as the “suspect class” analysis.402  Strict scrutiny means that 
legislation which involves a suspect classification (such as racial minori-
ties, women, or aliens) will be invalidated unless the state can show a 
compelling state interest.403  Suspect classification analysis was first ex-
plicitly used in 1944, in Korematsu v. United States.404  As one commen-
tator put it, Carolene Products’ analysis did not “culminat[e]” until 
Brown.405 
Ely has written that segregated schools were supported by racism, 
which was a “dominant strain” in American life then, and [today].406  On 
the other hand, he has also written that to be unconstitutional, racial dis-
crimination must be intentional,407 because the same governmental con-
duct can be both constitutional and unconstitutional depending on the 
                                                          
tion’s meaning to the directives actually contained within its four corners proves on analysis inca-
pable of keeping faith with the document’s promise . . . .  When we search for an external source of 
values with which to fill in the Constitution’s open texture . . . we search in vain . . . .  A quite dif-
ferent approach is available, and to discern its outlines we need look no further than to the Warren 
Court.” 
 399. By Justice Blackmun in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).  See also 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 148, 151. 
 400. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 401. Id. See also id. at n.11. 
 402. Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
107, 122 (1990). 
 403. See, e.g., id. at 132. 
 404. Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (holding that the 
relocation of Japanese residents on the West Coast constitutional). 
 405. Simon, supra note 402, at 125.  This author also has read, cites heavily to, and perhaps 
has been influenced by Ely, however. 
 406. See, e.g., Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 47. 
 407. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 140. 
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intent.408  However, Ely has also stated that forcing legislatures to articu-
late purposes (intent) for their legislation is not workable, since there are 
too many overlapping purposes when legislators vote on bills.409  Legis-
lative motivation should only be examined by courts when the “improper 
discrimination in the distribution of goods that are constitutionally gratu-
itous”410 is at stake.  The most important way to ordinarily read statutory 
provisions is on the plain language, in light of foreseeable effects, and “a 
healthy dose of common sense.”411  Aren’t the appropriate questions 
then, under Ely’s reasoning, whether segregation by race is intentional 
discrimination, and whether its legislative motivation may be examined 
by the court because “constitutionally gratuitous goods” are being “dis-
tributed” with “improper discrimination”?  What “constitutionally gratu-
itous goods” are being “distributed”?  Public education?   
Assuming public education is a “constitutionally gratuitous good,” 
is segregation of schools by race discrimination, and if so, is it “improp-
er” and “intentional”?  Ely has asserted that Brown is correct without of-
fering any evidence or explanation why.  Apparently he relies on the 
same social psychology studies that the Brown Court did.412  Yet, while 
on the one hand supporting the Court’s reliance on the social psychology 
studies,413 Ely has also maintained that that the social psychology studies 
which the Court relied on “when not simply irrelevant to the Court’s 
point” are, at least, widely professionally criticized.414 
Furthermore, Ely has stressed that “entrusted with the care of the 
nation’s principles,” the Court “should hesitate to issue a pronouncement 
which can be read to mean that Negroes are different from white per-
sons. . . .”415  Ely does not mention that the Brown Court’s insistence 
that segregated schooling harms black children was in effect averring 
that black children are different from white children.  After all, there was 
no discussion by the Court that white children were harmed by segrega-
tion.  Ely does not make such a distinction, either.416  Ely has actually 
                                                          
 408. Id. at 137. 
 409. Id. at 129 (agreement on purpose would be hard to come by). 
 410. John Hart Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis.  15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1155, 1160-61 (1978): “It . . . cannot be emphasized too strongly that analysis of motivation is ap-
propriate only to claims of improper discrimination in the distribution of goods that are constitu-
tionally gratuitous.”  “Constitutionally gratuitous” refers to benefits which people are not entitled to 
as a matter of substantive constitutional law.  Id. at 1160-61. 
 411. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 130. 
 412. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 413. See Loving, supra note 307, at 216 n.7. 
 414. See id. at 216-17.  See also id. at 217 n.9. 
 415. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 252. 
 416. Ely has elsewhere inferred that minorities are different from white majorities.  In his dis-
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commented that the Brown Court “would have been better off not citing 
sources for the proposition that segregation harms black children,” but 
rather should have retorted: “A white legislature tells you that because of 
your color you’re not fit to go to school with their children and you’re 
not hurt?  Get serious.”417  So the Court’s reasoning was wrong, but the 
ends justify the means? 
In any event, Ely seems to simply accept the Brown Court’s reli-
ance on the Fourteenth Amendment, when he states that only “race-like” 
classifications should be considered “suspect.”418  Yet, how Ely’s sup-
port of Brown squares with his assertion that suspect classes must be 
systematically barred access to the political system419 is confusing.  How 
do segregated schools bar black children, even implicitly or consequen-
tially, from the political process?  After all, it must be remembered, the 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment are about equal access to 
the political process and discriminatory practices, not substantive rights 
(like the right to desegregated schooling).  Courts never said that schools 
have to be racially balanced.420 
Perhaps Ely and the Brown Court’s implicit reliance upon Carolene 
Products, and their assumption that segregation causes black children 
harm may be attributed to the fault found in Carolene Products by Jus-
tice Rehnquist: “It would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a law-
yer to find ‘insular and discrete’ minorities at every turn in the road.”421  
In other words, lacking concrete evidence that segregation causes black 
children (alone) harm, perhaps Ely, as the Brown Court, simply decided 
to “find” what amounts to a discrete and insular minority, and thereafter 
“legitimately” impose morality upon the school systems because with 
“suspect” classes such morality imposition is acceptable.  It seems that, 
though Ely denies it, he is affirming that courts are in the best position to 
                                                          
cussion of the effects of creating black Democratic majority-minority voting blocks, Ely comments 
that even though creation of such blocks “bleaches” the surrounding areas, creating a higher per-
centage of overall Republican districts, the Democrats don’t try to block the creation of majority-
minority districts.  This is partly because the minority constituents lobby for such voting blocks de-
spite the fact that the Republican districts are thereby increased.  Ely appears to be inferring here 
that the minority constituents aren’t intelligent enough to figure out that the voting blocks do not 
work due to “bleaching”.  Ely, supra note 317, at 618-19. 
 417. Loving, supra note 307, at 222 n.21 (noting that other commentators have agreed and cit-
ing Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960)). 
 418. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 149. 
 419. Id. at 166 (discussing women). 
 420. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 255. 
 421. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 723, 729 (1974). 
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make moral judgments.422 
But shouldn’t we be wary of Ely’s warning that when courts start 
imposing values, it is systematically in the interests of the upper-middle 
professional class?423  As Ely commented of the Court’s 1977 freedom 
of expression opinions, the opinions flowed not from a Carolene Prod-
ucts perspective, but from “a jurisprudence that defines the Court’s role 
as one of protecting those values the Court regards as truly fundamen-
tal.”424  Judges and commentators alike often think they are speaking in 
terms of some objective standard, but they are in fact “discovering” their 
own upper-middle class values.425  Lower-class needs such as food, jobs, 
or shelter are never deemed “fundamental.”426  So why school desegre-
gation? 
Well, perhaps, in Ely’s own words: “The large liberal center of le-
gal academia [is] characteristically fearful of getting out of step with the 
latest trend. . . .”427 Certainly by 1954 or 1994, the trend was moving 
away from apartheid.  However, interpretivism is not a passing fad.  
Courts always try to talk in interpretivist terms.428 
However, the Court sometimes takes it upon itself to change fun-
damental aspects of Constitutional law.  Well, all right, even Ely has 
changed his mind about a fundamental right.429  Sometimes the Court 
amends the Constitution when it should not.”430  Sometimes even single 
judges can carry terrific amounts of weight.  Overall, Ely’s views on the 
present state of the governmental structure cast a dim light; each branch 
has long been in serious constitutional breach.  Even most legal writing 
                                                          
 422. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 57 (Ely denying that courts should make 
moral judgments). 
 423. Id. at 59: 
Thus the list of values the Court and the commentators have tended to enshrine as fun-
damental is a list with which readers of this book will have little trouble identifying: ex-
pression, association, education, academic freedom, the privacy of the home, personal 
autonomy, even the right not to be locked into a stereotypically female sex role and sup-
ported by one’s husband. 
 424. Fundamental Values, supra note 293, at 14-15. 
 425. Id. at 16. 
 426. See id. at 37-38. 
 427. Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 838. 
 428. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 289, at 3. 
 429. In his earlier career, Ely decried the privacy right, but later changed his mind and stated 
that it’s “entirely proper to infer a general privacy right, so long as care is taken in defining the sort 
of right the inference will support.”  ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 286.  “I later 
changed my mind about the propriety of inferring a general constitutional right of ‘privacy,’ though 
I continued to have qualms about whether it would apply in cases like Griswold and Roe.”  Id. at 
455 n.3. 
 430. Id. at 299 (discussing Roe v. Wade). 
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today, Ely tells us, boils down to nothing but political preferences.  
Hence, the recent lack in consensus on what constitutes good scholar-
ship.431  It all comes down to politics.432 
2.  And What He Says Now 
Ely once wrote, “If you’re going to be a judge, the United States 
Supreme Court has its advantages.”433  Apparently.  Ely commenced his 
Panel speech by reminding the audience that he, as all the other Panel-
ists, inevitably let their own theories “seep in.”434  Okay, he’s not stray-
ing too far from what he has written about judges needing to be unusual-
ly strong in order to avoid being affected by a desirable political 
outcome.435  Ely also commented that unlike the Brown Court, this Panel 
is not unanimous.  Considering the members of the Panel, he says this is 
only natural.  He then attributed the Warren Court’s Brown decision’s 
unanimity to Justice Warren himself.  Okay, so sometimes single justices 
hold terrific amounts of power.  We have heard that before. 
Ely proceeds to address the famous social psychology footnote.  He 
calls the critics’ claim that courts should not engage in psychology “pre-
posterous,”436 because if one wants to know about social psychology, 
one should obviously ask social psychologists.  The trouble is that Ely 
admits that the social psychology studies which the Brown Court cited 
had been almost universally criticized in the social psychology literature.  
So Courts should rely on social psychology studies even if they are 
poorly conducted and have faulty results? 
This dilemma Ely quickly cleans up by sweepingly accepting the 
social psychology studies because it is “self-evidently absurd” that black 
children can choose to be hurt by segregated schooling, as the Plessy 
Court had attested.  Clearly, Ely says, insecurity and inferiority feelings 
are generated by segregation, because if a white legislature tells the 
black children that they are not fit to go to school with their white chil-
dren, the black children will be hurt.  Plessy is overruled.  Period. 
Hold on.  The social psychology studies are deficient, so where is 
Ely getting the conclusion that black children are harmed by segregated 
                                                          
 431. Id. at 475 n.15. 
 432. However, Ely has attacked realists, particularly the extreme realists who believe Courts 
should act as politicians and impose their own values.  See, e.g., Fundamental Values, supra note 
293, at 17. 
 433. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 414 n.176. 
 434. See Ely, supra note 26. 
 435. See, e.g., Another Such Victory, supra note 319, at 835-36 n.8. 
 436. See Ely, supra note 26. 
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schools?  Are the black children actually hearing from a white legisla-
ture that they are unfit to go to school with the legislature’s children?  
Since when do legislatures communicate with school children?  It 
sounds as if Ely is doing little more than making the “unthinkable” ar-
gument—an argument which he later in his speech accuses Michaelman 
of leaning towards.  The “unthinkable” argument, Ely asserts, is “dan-
gerous,” especially with Supreme Court Judges.  Yet isn’t this what Ely 
is saying: It is unthinkable that black children cannot be harmed, so it’s 
unconstitutional. 
Ely attacks the Warren Court for making the “unthinkable” argu-
ment, when it said that it is unthinkable that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause should not apply to the federal District 
of Colombia.  The Warren Court was therefore suggesting that there was 
no rational construction for the Equal Protection Clause not applying to 
the federal government.  Ely says the Warren Court was wrong—there is 
a rational reason.  The reconstruction Congress trusted itself more than it 
did the state legislatures.  Perfectly psychologically plausible. 
Ely then quickly dismisses the idea that due process could contain 
such a substantive demand as being contained in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, since an amendment ratified in 1791 (the Fifth) cannot 
contain one ratified in 1868 (the Fourteenth).  To do so would to be turn-
ing somersaults with time.  The Equal Protection Clause was intended to 
apply to the states, but in a context which already had been acknowl-
edged “in various contexts” as being applicable to the federal govern-
ment.  Ely claims he has annotations for this blanket assertion, but does 
not bother to share them.  So, the Bolling problem is solved.  But his lis-
teners really don’t know how.  He refers his listeners to his book De-
mocracy and Distrust. 
As far as the remedy is concerned, Ely would require immediate 
compliance, but the Constitution, he tells us, requires no more than de-
segregation.  Therefore, busing and demographic equality within the 
schools is not constitutionally required.  Busing, in fact, did more harm 
than good, at least in Boston, where Ely attended law school during the 
busing period.  Ely reminisces about Harvard dinner parties he attended 
where people were “tut-tutting” about how racist the Irish were.  The 
Irish’s reaction was only normal though, Ely tells us, because they were 
the ones feeling “under siege” by the busing.  The elite of Harvard and 
Boston had their children tucked away in private or suburban schools.  Is 
he inferring that, in addition to the Irish, the elite circle Ely frequently 
dined amongst, were indeed racist but did not have need to show it?  So 
overall, the Warren Court relied on poorly conducted studies, inaccurate-
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ly interpreted the Equal Protection Clause’s application to the federal 
government, used the dangerous “unthinkability” standard, and appar-
ently did not do so well with their remedy.  Yet, the Warren Court’s 
holding, at least, is to be upheld.  However, Ely gives us little, if any, 
explanation why. 
It is ironic that Ely should play a Supreme Court Justice, and attack 
the Warren Court’s opinion as viciously as he did.  He once wrote that 
even if law professors could agree on what is “good . . . there is no rea-
son to assume their judgment is any better on that issue than the 
Court’s.”437  It seems Ely, as well as every other panelist, has just such 
an assumption in mind. 
It is also ironic that Ely has, in his writings, shared some of his per-
sonal and religious background with his readers in the past.  He has told 
his readers that he descended from three centuries of Presbyterian minis-
ters on both sides of his family,438 and he has also told that his thinking 
has remained “essentially consistent” from his student days to the pre-
sent.  He has commented that this continuity in thought is “frightening” 
to him, but he does not consider it a defect.439  He has further comment-
ed that his family religious history does not really give him authority to 
speak ex cathedra.440 Yet, he has on more than one occasion quoted a 
particular Bible passage in his writings: “Indeed, those not so hopelessly 
mired in legal positivism as I am often accused of being would do well 
to consult their Bibles, in particular Leviticus 24:22: ‘Ye shall have one 
manner of Law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: 
for I am the LORD your God.’”441  The irony is that Ely often does in 
his panel speech speak ex cathedra.  He does not quote the Bible. 
Yet the legal positivism he is “accused” of, and the legal process he 
has held himself out as an adherent to is utterly absent from his Panel 
discussion.  Plessy is sweepingly overruled.  The primary authority for 
his Brown and Bolling rulings are an obscure certainty that blacks are 
harmed, and another obscure conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause 
was already acknowledged to apply to the federal government—despite 
the fact that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the federal 
government.  Citations, explanation, and evidence are deemed unneces-
sary, apparently.  Sounds rather ex cathedra. 
                                                          
 437. ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND, supra note 284, at 294. 
 438. Id. at 197. 
 439. Id. at 188 (perhaps confining this continuity of thought to religious clauses, but perhaps 
not). 
 440. Id. at 197. 
 441. Id. at 390 n.199. 
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Another irony is a story he once told his readers about a speech he 
gave in Germany.  Shortly before having to go on stage, he decided with 
a colleague what to speak on by flipping a coin.  The coin toss easily 
could have resulted in Ely having to speak on something he did not be-
lieve in.  This did not seem to bother Ely in the least.442  Would Ely do 
the same thing at this Panel discussion?  That is, would he simply up-
hold Brown despite all he has written on legal process and the proper 
role of courts because that is the politically correct thing to do?  Is this 
why he neglected to give his audience any concrete explanations for his 
conclusions? 
Apparently, his panel opinion is so obviously accurate that details 
can easily be omitted.  (He did not run out of time, he actually com-
plained, perhaps jokingly, that he had a whole five minutes left to 
speak).  Perhaps law professors do actually have better judgment than 
courts—even the great Warren Court?  Perhaps Ely does have the right 
to speak ex cathedra?  Perhaps Ely flipped a coin before the Panel?  Per-
haps being on the Supreme Court does have its advantages—isn’t the 
Court, after all, where the grown ups are? 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A.  Speculation on Panel Conflicts 
We have tried to speculate a little bit on how the conflict between 
the Panelists’ previous positions and their Panel opinions could occur.  
One explanation is that the Panelists meant to give us an object lesson in 
how the game is played.  If one is playing checkers—or, perhaps, sitting 
as a Fourth Century Mediterranean bishop on a monumental theological 
council—this is how that game is played.  Maybe our secular Panel 
Bishops wanted to say: We do not necessarily think checkers is a good 
game, but if we must play we want to distinguish ourselves and win.  
Similarly, the Bishops at Nicaea may have thought: We do not necessari-
ly like the term homoousios and what it does to the sacred text, but ac-
cepting it is better than political upheaval and anathematism.  There is a 
received tradition of methodological orthodoxy, and a canon, albeit ex-
pandable, and here is the best justification that can be given in that mode 
under the circumstances at hand. 
Another possibility is that “none of these Ivy League scholars was 
going to commit academic and political death by overturning Brown be-
                                                          
 442. Id. at 31-32. 
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cause it conflicted with their jurisprudential beliefs.”443  This introduces 
a hard note of reality.  The jurisprudence student writing this opinion 
went on to indicate that certain economic incentives were involved, such 
as book contracts, more prestigious appearances, and the like.444  We do 
not believe that these distinguished panelists could be influenced by 
book contracts or other such factors.  However, for some ineffable rea-
son, what the student says is true.  It could destroy her credibility if an 
academic were to pronounce Brown morally incorrect.445 
Also, it may be opined that few of the participants may have 
thought seriously about how their opinions could have impetus beyond 
the week’s event.446  This is a plausible explanation, and supports the 
general idea that the Panelists’ powers of self-reflection were suspended.  
The idea of the Brown Panel seemed to be a good one.  Knowledge 
could be disseminated, ideas exchanged, a book written, professional ob-
ligations and duties accomplished—where is the problem?  The problem 
is that of intense internal contradiction, and affirming the insight that the 
Panelists left the impression (perhaps unintended) that legal realism is 
correct: law is or often can be manipulated and result-oriented.  In other 
words, the text may essentially be subjected to different interpretations 
responsive to forces outside the text.447 
Another jurisprudence student was not surprised at all that the Pan-
elists used the standard positivist mold to affirm Brown, in spite of hold-
ing jurisprudential theories that positivism was not an appropriate label 
for the processes actually followed in the legal process.448  Presumably, 
this student has come to expect that jurisprudence will be selected to 
achieve the political result desired.  The student found the Jurisprudence 
labels—realism, positivism, and so on—academic prattle, which does 
not conform to what it takes to cope in real world situations.449  She also 
argued that no one—academics or other legalists—really function out of 
                                                          
 443. Brian Stabley, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) (paper on file 
with the Authors).  An earlier draft of our article was presented to Professor Van Doren’s jurispru-
dence seminar class for written comments.  We thank the class for their reflections. 
 444. Id. 
 445. See Canon, supra note 89, at 998 (“one establishes oneself as a properly acculturated law-
yer by affirming Brown’s correctness.”). 
 446. Jackson Maynard, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) (paper on 
file with the Authors).  
 447. However, the fact that this Panel intended to produce a book would mitigate against the 
idea that the Panel offerings were “disposable.” 
 448. Descera Daigle, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) (paper on file 
with the Authors).  
 449. Interview with Descera Diagle, student, Florida State C. of L., in Tallahassee, FL (Mar. 
2001). 
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boxes such as positivism or realism exclusively.  Thus, the Panelists 
were displaying a pragmatism that legalists generally employ. 
Another jurisprudence student opined much as some of the Florida 
State Law Professors did: What did you expect the Panelists to do?450  
The litigants are entitled to a reasoned opinion according to what she 
called “the rules of the game.”  This student criticized us for labeling an-
yone who even refers to the Constitution as a formalist, and asked where 
our (the authors’) opinion is.  Legal realism may be fine, but how do you 
write a realist opinion? The card carrying realists, like Jerome Frank (we 
might add), adopted the positivist mode when he became a judge, de-
spite his resounding attack on it.  Basically the student critic argued that 
none of the panel opinions conflicted with their previous writings, be-
cause none really rejected the rule of law in their previous writings.451 
Whether or not the Panelists rejected the rule of law, they did cast 
serious doubt on it.  The Panelists we review find the system malleable 
in varying degrees.  In other words, they are often “legal realists” when 
they write.  Moreover, there is an analogy to Pascal’s Wager.  Pascal 
said that maybe there is a God, and maybe not.  But on the chance there 
might be a God, I will behave as though there is.452  We doubt that most 
contemporary religions are very happy with this wager because it dele-
gitimates the enterprise.  Similarly, if the distinguished Panelists want to 
say, “Even though we doubt it, we choose the formalist mode because it 
is taken as the effective mode for determining legal controversy,” that 
will sufficiently delegitimate the “law god” to make our effort worth-
while.  So as our “stupidest housemaid” suggests in the Introduction: 
“So much for the rule of law.  And that scare me too.”453 
B.  Closing Argument 
In summary, we have argued that the AALS Constitutional Panel 
on Brown had similarities to the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE.  Both so-
cieties were handling a crisis, a perceived need for religious orthodoxy: 
the labeling of religious heresy in Nicaea, and secular policies out of 
                                                          
 450. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 451. See Eugenia Khankhasayev, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) 
(paper on file with the Authors).  
 452. On Pascal’s Wager, See generally 16 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 325 (1993) 
(existence of God cannot be proven, but one is better off believing because if right, there is eternal 
life, and if wrong, little is lost). 
 453. See supra note 2; cf. Ronald Dworkin, New York Review of Books, Feb. 22, 2001, at 9-
10 (suggesting that the Supreme Court in the Bush/Gore election rendered a decision responsive to 
their political agenda, dressed in unprincipled legal garb) (book review). 
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synch with international and national political needs and ideals in 
Brown.  Both were settled with cognizance of a political spectrum, more 
by policy or political force field than by the dictates of doctrine.454  In 
both cases, there was a reinforcement of a methodological orthodoxy, 
Scriptures and the Constitution, as the source of truth by agreement, for 
a time at least. 
The AALS Panel was unanimous in affirming the result in Brown, 
which is remarkable in itself because of the immense controversy when 
Brown was decided.  However, we have recounted two fault lines in the 
Panel opinions.  First, the dissonance flowing from the conflicts in com-
position of sources or canon relied upon, and the even greater dissonance 
from the variety of justifications drawn from the canon.  Second, most of 
the Panelists used formalism, in contrast with the conflicting jurispru-
dence of their prepanel writings, at least the ones we selected at random.  
Some prepanel writings disdained the use of the Courts at all to further 
causes important to the Panel members, such as improved race rela-
tions.455  Most of the Panelists we studied in detail decried formalism 
and the operations of the legal structure at large in their prepanel writ-
ings, but were willing to use it when it suited their purposes. 
How could this happen?  While it could be an exercise in conscious 
deception,456 we doubt this possibility.  Whatever the motives of the 
Panelists, one of the most interesting things is that their enterprise is an 
inadvertent example of postmodernism: their unfolding revelation of an-
ti-foundationalism and anti-formalism in their writings, while upholding 
formalism at least for limited purposes in their affirmation of Brown.  
There is, in any event, irony where an exercise designed to vindicate rea-
son and formalism ends up showing extreme manipulation, virtual mean-
inglessness of the canon, and at worst inadvertent hypocrisy caused by 
the tension between the panel opinions and the previous writings.457 
We suggest that politics and current conceptions of morality con-
trolled both the Council of Nicaea and the Brown Panel.  Constantine 
                                                          
 454. See Michael Klarman, Mason Ladd, Lecture at Florida State Univ. College of Law, 
“Brown v. Board of Education: Law or Politics?” (Jan. 26, 2001) (lecturer argues that the two most 
conservative members of the Brown Court were influenced to go along due to politics of winning 
the Cold War). 
 455. See Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 71 (1985) (courts 
were of little help in the parable told by Bell in attacking racist law). 
 456. See Rob Atkinson, Nihilism Need Not Apply: Law and Literature in Barth’s The Floating 
Opera, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 747, 815-16 (2000) (suggesting that a novelist may have consciously at-
tempted deception). 
 457. Canon, supra note 89, at 1020 (would we really be happy discussing how to make slave 
law the best it can be?).  Could it be that instead Professor Balkin had his tongue in his cheek and 
set a trap for his victims? 
77
MacGrady and Van Doren: Another Council of Nicaea?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
MACGRADY1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:50 PM 
448 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: 3/4 
wanted to consolidate and pacify his potentially unruly empire.  The 
United States wanted to expand its empire to the hearts and minds of the 
Third World.458  Texts with symbolic value to the citizens involved were 
drawn into service by the legal priesthood to resolve needs outside the 
texts. 
Incidentally, hopefully some appropriate moral natural law, if any 
there were, was vindicated in Brown.  Indeed, perhaps there is a further 
parallel between the Brown Panel and the Council of Nicaea: religious or 
“natural law.”  Perhaps the Panelists’ unanimity in result and reliance on 
methodological orthodoxy, if not in precise method (which canon to 
use), is supportive of a natural law moral result.  As the Bishops at Ni-
caea (and perhaps even Constantine himself459) convened, deliberated, 
and ultimately resolved their controversy under the belief that God’s 
singular will would ultimately be manifested,460 the Brown Panel seems 
to be inadvertently suggesting a similar belief in an invincible moral dic-
tate.  It is as if the Panelists were saying to us collectively: Brown is af-
firmed because there is only one moral choice no matter how the canon 
is read.  The inadvertence of this “religious” undertone underlines its 
very presence.  On the other hand, the manipulation of the canon by the 
Panel, and the Panel’s ability to draw contradictory inferences from the 
same canon appears to seriously undermine a natural law approach.  If 
natural law means an objective referent outside traditional legal materi-
                                                          
 458. See Bell supra note 40. 
 459. Though scholars are not in agreement on Constantine’s religious convictions, see 
COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 29, some suggest that Constantine’s personal religion was not add odds 
with Christianity, and hence Nicaea was not solely a political matter.  See CHADWICK, supra note 
54, at 125-32.  “[C]onstantine was not aware of any mutual exclusiveness between Christianity and 
his faith in the Unconquered Sun.  The transition from solar monotheism . . . to Christianity was not 
difficult.”  Id. at 126.  Before a battle, Constantine said that he once saw a cross across the midday 
sun inscribed with “By this conquer.”  Id.  In other words, the line between paganism and Christian-
ity was not so distinct, and Constantine may not have only been playing politics with the Bishops; 
perhaps he did feel he had a religious duty to unify the empire as the secular “sun.”  Still, Constan-
tine knew that the military victories that he needed to consolidate his  empire were thought by 
Christians to be the will of the Christian God.  See id. at 125 (his decisive victory in battle thought 
to be the will of the Christian God). 
 460. See COUNCILS, supra note 43, at 57 ([w]hatever is decided in the holy councils of the 
bishops must be attributed to the divine will.).  The fact that the Nicene Creed was later repudiated 
is irrelevant to the analogy to natural law because God’s will can change.  (Co-author Van Doren 
does not agree that natural law is a term properly invoked when the moral tenets used change dia-
metrically over time.  Co-author MacGrady thinks that natural law can be invoked even when moral 
tenets change over time because depending upon which religious or spiritual viewpoint one is com-
ing from, natural law can be understood in different in ways.  For example, to a Christian, natural 
law may mean the dictate of a Christian “Other” God (Other than the human self), while to a Bud-
dhist there is no “other” to give such dictates; to a Buddhist time is not linear and what is morally 
right can well change over “time.”) 
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als to provide objective guidance, it is difficult to see it in this panel ex-
ercise.461 
Or finally, not implausibly, maybe the Panelists meant to play with 
us (deceive us?) and are laughing at us!  On the other hand, as one of the 
Jurisprudence students remarked, at the end of the day, “are we [not] 
laughing at them. . . . ?”462 
                                                          
 461. Unless one is willing to accept a definition of natural law which would include an “objec-
tive” referent manifested in different forms.  In other words, the Panelists agreed on the result, but 
now how to get there. 
 462. Jimmy Midyette, Jurisprudence Paper, Florida State C. of L. (March 7, 2001) (paper on 
file with the Authors).  
79
MacGrady and Van Doren: Another Council of Nicaea?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
